The Fourth Divorce Suit Refused

For the firgt time in many years, a divorce suit pushed to the end, has resultcd in the denial of a divorce. The facts are fully set forth in the.forcible opinión delivered by Judge Kinne last Monday, which is as follows: The Circuit Court for the County of Washtenaw. In Chancery. Caroline Krause vs. Caleb Krause. The bill in this case is filed to obtain a decree of divorce f rom the bonds of matrimony. This cause presents an extraordinary record, anc in my opinión, it demands more than the ordinary consideration. These parties were first married in 1863, in this county. They have five children, whose ages range from 27 to 9. During this period, in this county, they have been married to each other, three times, and this is their fourth bilí for a divorce. The decrees of divorce, hitherto granted, have been based upon substantially the same allegations of cruelty as those now presentcd, they do not pertain to the same periods of time, but they are the same in character. The complainant has not been deceived by the defendant. No new developments appear, but simply repetitions of their earlier troubles,which perhaps have increased in intensity by reason of experience. In short, when they have mutually been inclined to courtship, they have engaged in that amusement, then married, and when weary of that relation, have sought relief in divorce. Again when life apart became irksome, they have reunited, and thus this domestic farce has reached its present status. The question is presented, whether or not, upon such a record as this, the complainant ought to receive any relief. In my opinión, it is a sad commentary upon the legislation of the state, that such a condition of things as this record exhibits is possible within our borders. Divorce, under certain conditions, is undoubtedly moral, lawfui and wise, but in my opinión, the public good demands, that four-fifths of the decrees granted, should never be entertained. Courts, however, with our present legislation, are powerless to arrest this alarming social evil. As a rule the case is so presented that the court has no discretion or option in the matter. It needs no disseration to prove that the welfare and prosperity of this commonwealth depends primarily upon the purity, the sacredness, and the permanence of the marriage relation. Facility to obtain divorce causes parties to enter that most sacred of all human relations without due thought, and as ït would seemin many cases, withno care or expectation for its perpetuity. Among -the better classes of society there isundoubtedly ahealthy public sentiment upon this question, but it does not reach the halls of legislation, or those classes upon whom moral obligations hang lightly. In brief, this conceded right of divorce is to-day most shamelessly abused, and if this abuse is to increase or continue, public interests demand that it be abrogated e'xcept on scriptural grounds. So far as the pending case is concerned, her counsel insist that she has brought herself within the statute, and that this court has no option but to pronounce the decree of divorce. Can it be possible that the legislature ever contemplated the existence of such a record as is here presented? that husband and wife may marry,quarrel, separate and remarry at their mere caprice, and receive the assistance and approval of courts? Is it expected that courts are to expend their labors in such investigations ? It is said that a court is a place where justice is judicially administered? If the counsel for complainant is right in this case, courts are a mockery and travesty on justice. I am not aware of any precedent to guide me in this case. I have no hesitation to créate one, that shall be good within this court until reversed by the appellate tribunal. I shall assume that a court possesses the power to maiutain its self respect, to protect itself from ridicule and disgrace, and that it has the inherent right to preserve its own integrity. It is the intention of this decree to instruct the complainant that the marital bond is something more han a mere brute conjugation of he parties, that it should be assumed with the utmost consideration and solemnity, and that when once established, under all ordinary circumstances, it remains indissoluble. She is further instructed that she has more than once sought the interposition of this court, and in the exercise of its equitable powers, she has been released from her marita! obligations, that with a full knowledge of all thejresponsibilities of the future, she has again deliberately taken upon herself these same ties and responsibilities, that she has exhausted her remedies in this court and that she will not now be heard to complain of the burdens of a contract of marriage, which she assumed at her peni. In their moral and legal aspect, these proceedings are contemptuous to the dignity of this court. The relief sought will be denied,and this court expresses its deep regret at its inability to commit these parties to a reformatory during their natural lives. March 30, 1891.