Mrs. Fillmore Wins

Yesterday afternoon Judge Kinne filed his opinión in the case of Mrs. Fillmore vs. the Great Camp of the Knights of Maccabees. The decisión has been awaited with so much interest, that we give the opinión in full. In Maren. 1885. Ariel H. Fillmore, the husband of the complainant, became a membev of the Knights of the Maccabees of the State of Michigan. In September, 1892, the Great Camp cL the K. of M. adopted the following rule or by-law: "A member who shall hereaEter engage either as principal or servant in the manufacture or sale of spirituous or malt liquors as a beverage, shall thereby forfeit his membership in the order and all rights and beneflts thereof and no money shall be accepted from him by any officer of the Tent for dues and assessments. No trial shall be necessary in such cases where the fact is admitted." In January, 1893, Mr. Fillmore became the owner of $5,000 stock in the Northern Brewery, a Corporation organized under the laws of the state and engaged in the manufacture of ager beer at Ann Arbor. In June, 1893, Mr. Fillmore died, leaving the complainant, his widow and the beneficiary named in the endowment certifícate. In February, 1893, the commander of Arbor Tent duly notified the Great Commander of said order of the ownership of said stock by said Fillmore and requested a ruling as to the effect thereof. The Great Commander officially determined that said Fillmore "had violated the rules of the order and had forfeited his membership." Thereupon Arbor Tent took action in the matter and the defendants declined thereafter to recognize said Fillmore as a member of said order. In July, 1S93, at the request of Mrs. Fillmore, the treasurer of Arbor Tent wrote to the Great Record Keeper a?king for blank proofs of death. He replied that there was no necessity for making proof of death, that inasmuch as Mr. Fillmore had cngaged in a prohibited business, the claim had no valué. Thereupon the bill in this case was filed. There are several important questions presented by the record in this case. Some of them are not free from doubt, but it is important to all parties that these questions shall be finally adjudicated, and I therefore state my conclusions fully. At the threshold, we are met v.'ith this problem. Did the purchase and holding of the brewery stock "ipso facto" viólate the by-law quoted? The complainant says, No. The defendant says, Yes. The objects of the society are declared to be "to unite fraternally all male persons of sound bodily health and good moral character who are socially acceptable, to give moral and material aid, to edúcate all its members, socially, morally and intellectually; to relieve the sick and distressed, and to establish a benefit fund." Section 86, in declaring the eligibility of proposed members admits all males of good moral character, between the ages of 18 and 51, excepting engineers, firemen, conductors, etc, in the employ of railroads, including other certain classes whose occupation is hazardous and excepting those addicled to the intemperate use of intoxicating liquors or engaged either as principal, agent or servant in the sale bf spirituous or malt liquors as a beverage. It is clear that these provisions address themselves solely to two propositions. First, the personal qualities of the proposed members, and secondly, to the hazard and danger risks of their occupationt. They suggest no antagonism against any industry or business as such. It not infrequently occurs that parties in this state who are about to embark in some business enterprise instead of creating a copartnership fornv a corporation. The stock is usually coiifined to those directly interested and the stockholders are all actually engagred in the business as agents, workmen, offlcers, managers, salesmen or otherwfse. It is not necessary to determine the effect of such a condition. It is enough tó say that no such state of facts is presented by this record. Mr.Fillmore appears as a mere holder of stock. He was neither agent or officer of the Brewing Company. He does tjot appear to have ever even entered upon the premises of the company. It does not appear that he possessed the slightest knowledge of the affairs of the corporación or that they efer ri one moment of his attention. Under these drcumstánces can it be successfully urged that he was engaged as principal in the business of this company within the meaning of this by-law? Can it be said that the mero holding of stock in a railroad company is engaging in the railroad business; that by the holding of stock in a mining company or a bank or a manufacturing company that thereby the holder of such stock has engaged as a principal in the mining, banking or manufacturing business? Within the meaning of such a by-law the Corporation is the. person, the entity, the principal. Ft is a matter of common knovvledge that stocks of different kinds are held by parties ivho do not possess the least knowledge of the details of the business and who do not exercise the slightest interference with management of the company. I think therefore that the defend-ints were in error in their construction and interpretation of this by-law and that their attempt to deprive the complainant of the benefits accruing at the death of her husband is unjust and unlawful. It is the further contention of the defendants that even if the construction placed by them upon this by-law is erroneous, that the remedy of the complainant is conflned to the order and that she can have no redress in the courts of this state. Undoubtedly such is the manifest intention of the rules of the defen.lant. Indeed, it is the express declaration of the order that the decisión of the Great Camp shall be final, and that no suit in law or in equity shall be commenceë by a beneflciary. This is not a provisión looking to the adjustment of claims within the order and exhausting the remedy there before resorting to the courts: It is an unquestioned attempt by this association to créate a judicial tribunal within its own ranks for the final and "onclusive settlement of all controversies with its members. It is a somewhat startling proposition that within the state there exists an organization embracing perhaps 50,000 persons to whom the courts of this state are barred. I thir.k such a doctrine would be rather unwelcome intelligence to the rank :tnd file of this association. It may be conceded that in all ordinary matters of discipline or policy redress shall be confined to the decree of the Great Camp. This may be allowed on the theory of economy. As long as the officers are proceeding within the Unes of iti? rules and regulations, I understand that the courts of this state rit-cli.ie to interfere. If, however, the acción is fraudulent or in controvention of its rules or oppressive, or if an attempt is made to enforce a regulation that is unreasonable, immoral or unlawful, or when the rights of property are involved I understand that the courts will interpose at the request of the injured party.. It has been said by the supreme court of the United States, "That every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of this country, and to' ,'nvoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him. A man may not barter away his life or hls freedom or his substantial rights." " "To créate a judicial tribunal is one of the functions of the sovereign power." This power is guarded by the most cautious rules. The construction and legal interpretation of a rule or by-law has always been regarded as a uuestion for the courts. It would ill accord wilh good government, that matters of this nature should be left to the judgm'jtit of the committee whose members are not only unskilled in the law, but subject to continual fluctuation. Certainty and uniformity are essential elements in the due administration of law. The question presented by the record is purely one of the true construction of one of the rules of this society. The complainant insists that by a misinterpretation of this rule or by-law by the officers of the defendant, she has been deprived of her just and legal benefits. Her remedy in the forum of the defendant has been forestalled ald foreclosed. Under such circumstanees to futilely pursue her claim before defendant might bar her of remedy within the legal tribunals of this state. I am of the opinión that the complainant has properly invoked the aid of this court, and that she is entitled to the relief sought. A decree may be entered oorrespondingly. Circuit Judge.