Cooley On State And Federal Rights

The address of the president of the American Bar Association, Judge T. M. Cooley, of this city, on the occasion of the annual meeting of the association at Saratoga lastWednesday, was a most scholarly and thoughtful production, and in view of the notable happenings of the past year, most timely. Coming from the source it does, one of the recognized highest constitutional authorities in the nation, and being given to the discussion of the practical workings of our government during one of the most eventful years of our national life, it cannot fail to interest every intelligent citizen. Judge Cooley sees in the experiences of the year influences at work which "have a bearing upon the vital principies of our political institutions," and which in the time to come may, under the fanaticism of ignorance and careless or unprincipled leadership, "put our constitutional structure under suspicion" and raise doubts as to "whether the freedom we enjoy is more than nominal." "When such time comes," says the Judge, "the most fundamental principies may be in need, not merely of tacit acceptance, but of a defense that will consist in active and aggressive warfare upon those who in disorderly or unconstitutional ways assail them." In his discussion of the so-called Coxey movement he condemns the same as inimical to the basic principies of our system, without warrant in law, and but for the tolerant disposition of the American people, dangerous to the public peace. He handles the sympathetic strike in the same vigorous manner, declaring that it is bad in moráis; and as to arbitration as a legal preventative of such outbreaks he considers it inadequate. As to the federal interference in the strike, and the rights and obligations of the general government, he speaks as follows: "Therewere national duties to be performed in Illinois, national officers, agents and courts to whom in part the performance was entrusted, and disorderly parties were interfering and rendering performances difficult - oftentimes impossible. But the position of the governor was that the mainteuance of peace and the repression of disorder was a state duty, and the president was guilty of usurpation when he tlius, without request, moved troops into the state for the purpose. We cannot admit that the position taken is even plausible. It has no warrant whatever in the federal constitution, which, on the contrary, is distinetly against it. "The president is to take care that the federal laws be f aithfully executed and his doing so is not made to depend on the will or consent of any one state. The duty is specially and in the ?st terrns imposed upou hita, and in the performance of it he is subordinite to no state authority. "Yet, if the views of the governor were accepted as sound, the mails might be stopped at Chicago, interstate commerce broken up, and the process of United States courts refused service unless the governor, when disorder was dominant, saw fit to suppress it, or cali upon the president to do so. If the protest was yielded to it was a concession that the governor and uot the president was to take care that the laws of the United States vvere faithfully executed in nis state, and if he failed to do so a mob might atpleasure defy them. The action taken by the two houses of congress in approving in emphatic terms what had been done by the president was equivalent to an expression of their opinión that the protest of the governor was not only unwarranted, but revolutionary. The sentiment of the country, as expressed in its public journals and otherwise, was to the same effect, and the question of constitutional law may be considered practically settled."