Campaign Of The Boers

 

CAMPAIGN OF THE BOERS

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Description of Their Fighting

Methods in The Field

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SCOPE OF THEIR PROBABLE PLANS

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Territory Where Operations would

Begin--Whole of the Boers' Mount-

ed Forces Are Estimated at 35,000

Men --Ammunition Each Man Car-

ries -- How the Horses Are Trained

 

The preparations on both sides indi-

cate that in the struggle between the

British and the Boers that now ap-

pears inevitable the principal fighting

will take place in and near the angle

of territory in Natal that lies between

the Drakensberg mountains and the

Buffalo river, says the New York Sun.

It is between the range of mountains

and the river that the railway from

Durban on the coast running through

Pietermaritz and Lady-Smith passes

into the Transvaal over the familiar

battlegrounds of the lngago and

Laingsnek, which form the avenue

and gateway into the Boer territory.

It is a serious disadvantage to the

Boers from a military point of view

that these points as well as Majuba

hill should be in the British territory

as the attempt to seize them for their

own protection would constitute an act

of war and precipitate the conflict.

They, therefore, are making such a

disposition of their forces as will en-

able them to keep back the British

advance in front while threatening its

flanks and Communications with Natal.

If successful in the design of their

present movements, they would secure

the principal strategic point required

for the defense of their frontier and

have avoided striking first.

Although their military organization

has made considerable progress since

their last war, the Boers mean to abide

by their tactics that have proved so

effectual in the past. A British officer

who has recently made an exhaustive

study of the Boer military system de-

scribes it as somewhat crude and pa-

triarchal, but with a decidedly good

field artillery officered by Europe-

Dutch army officers, and the Boer's

army is not to be despised.

With the exception of the troops de-

tailed to defend Pretoria and occupy

Johannesburg fort the whole of the

Boer forces are mounted, and are reck-

oned at 35,000 men. This estimate has

been formed from the number of rifles

issued to burghers after the Jameson

raid. The Boer tactics are unique.

Their horses are so trained that when

the reins are thrown over their necks

they remain immovable, and the Boer

fighting method is based on this fact

The commands of 100 men is their

tactical unit. These are concentrated in

scattered groups in rear of their out-

post line, and on the enemy being sig-

naled in force they canter away eccen-

trically, endeavoring to encircle his

line. Having selected their ground,

they dismount under cover, leaving

their horses, that never move, and open

a concentrating fire on the advancing

adversary. These were the tactics

that proved so successful in the last

war. At Laingsnek they galloped up

and outflanked the British force, and

at Lugago they formed a three -quarter

circle around General Colley and his

troops, who only escaped annihilation

by a night march, leaving the wounded

behind.

At Majuba a small force of Boers,

about half that of the British on the

summit of the hill. crept up the steep

slopes under cover of a heavy concen-

trating fire from the main body about

2,000 feet below. The British, unaware

of what was taking place, were sur-

prised and abandoned their position in

a panic, leaving their general and a

handful of men with him to their fate.

The Boer tactics may be briefly de-

scribed as great mobility, rapid power

of concentration on vulnerable points,

rapid retreats therefrom if seriously

threatened. but before this eventuates,

hoping to achieve a victory, and most

certainly inflicting great losses. This

power of rapid movement incidental

to all being mounted is the root of the

tactical question. increasing materially

their powers of offense and. indirectly,

of defense. Each Boer carries 150

rounds of ammunition, and biltong or

dried beef for four days, the horses

feeding on the veldt. They say they

can cover 200 miles in the four days, a

formidable advantage in making raids

on an enemy's Communications.

The opinion of the Boer officers is

that if the British employ less than 

80,000 men they are safe. On the Brit-

ish side the belief is that if one

big victory is won at the start the bubble

of the Boer resistance will burst, but

if, on the other hand. the British force

should meet a check, the consequences

to British prestige and supremacy

would be most serious.