"radicals" And Moderates Struggle For Control Of China's Future

The Political Crisis Behind the Great Wall

By Herbert Boyd

Off all the experts on foreign affairs, perhaps none are as plagued with doubt and uncertainty as the China-watchers. Even the most astute journalists and historians, often at the mercy of slogans, wall-posters (if they can get that close) and Hsinhua (the Chinese news agency), find it extremely difficult to make sense of China's ever shifting political currents.
Upon the recent elevation of Hua Kuo-feng to both Premier and First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party , George Bush, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was forced to admit that his agency was caught completely by surprise.
Except for maybe William Safire and Joseph Lelyveld of the New York Times Washington bureau, most China-watchers were convinced that Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping was the odds-on choice to succeed Chou En-lai. But like the essence of Taoism, that mystical Chinese philosophy, just when you think you're fairly sure of things and their outcome, they manage to elude your grasp.
Not until China's Cultural Revolution (1966-69) was any real attention given to the internal affairs of this country of nearly 900 million people. China's break with Russia, Nixon's visitations, and China's position on the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 have also brought some confusion as to the direction and intent of China's foreign policy.
However, it is the internal affairs of China that have been the most perplexing; the foreign policy, being infinitely more consistent, is much easier to follow and understand. Though the Soviet Union has apparently made some major gains in southern Africa, especially in Angola, China's present foreign policy -the firm anti-imperialist resolve -remains on course, and the commitment to oppose the superpowers and support the various wars of national liberation is at once consistent with the Chinese revolution.
Where some clarity may exist on China's foreign posture, the situation behind the Great Wall has been anything but smooth. Internally, modernization continues " to be China's primary theme. And some progress has been achieved toward economic stability, with China giving equal concern for agricultural and industrial pursuits. In this regard, China, despite its teeming population, manages to feed all its people, has no apparent inflation, and maintains a level of self-sufficiency that further baffles the Western world.
From an ideological standpoint, China again is on fairly solid ground. Though the Marxist-Leninist fervor is known to waver in intensity from time to time, the overall plan of class struggle and socialist construction continues unabated.
China's basic internal problem lies within the realm of politics. The flexibility that exists in some other sectors of the society is sadly absent here. At the core of the conflict is the struggle between the so-called moderates, or those who would downplay ideology and push the industrialization process, and the "radicals," who feel that to emphasize industrial development without mass political participation, is to have the outlook of the "capitalist roader". A good case in point is the Lin Piao crisis.
During an interview with Chou En-lai in November 1971 , writer William Hinton was able to clearly establish Lin Piao's position: that the Cultural Revolution had completed the transformation of China and " that, therefore, the main problem was to increase production. Thus, by freezing the existing inequities, Chou explained that capitalism would inevitably be restored in China.
To this, Hinton added, "Lin Piao began to quote China's most famous restorationist, Confucius. Mao took the position that the transformation of China had just begun. The main problem was still the conflict between the working class and a capitalist class that was constantly recreated by the still-unchanged social relations, such as commodity production and the use of money in buying and selling. He [Mao] was for continuing revolution."
Lin Piao had obviously broken with Mao over the political line, and like the Defense Minister before him, Peng Te-huai, and yet another infamous heir-apparent, Liu Shao-ch'i, he was to experience total humiliation and a death that remains shrouded in mystery.

The political line- that is, the correct political line- is a very important feature of Chinese society. Today, the main debate has found the left, the so-called radicals, insisting on more socialist purity in the "superstructural" (as opposed to the economic "base") realm of culture and politics. This would mean, for example, the practice of keen opposition to certain "pragmatic methods, on the ground that they can lead to a slackening of values that transcend methods," and, according to Ross Terrell, "an opposition to leaning on foreign technology, and finally a readiness to let spontaneity and 'going against the tide' interrupt, if need be, the steady beat of Party authority."
Another difficulty within China's domestic policy is the antagonism that occurs between the Left and the peasant-based PLA (People's Liberation Army). Here the issue of order and spontaneity is crucial. In addition, the PLA does not like the idea that Russia, the former running buddy, is now in the throes of social imperialism and must be deemed the principal contradiction in China's foreign policy.
In the recent unrest, the most astounding fact was the unprecedented demonstration in the heart of Peking. Like finding pork on a Muslim's fork, such a thing was unheard of and never seen. Who were these upstart young turks? Was this a spontaneous expression of political dissatisfaction, or merely a well-planned ruse by the Party to cover the expulsion of a cancerous growth? Were the radicals now in control of things? These are just a few of the questions from which only more questions result.
Whether this is the dawn of the second Cultural Revolution (of which Mao said there would be many ), or but a noisy compromise between the radicals and the moderates, we can only guess. But it is rather interesting that Hua. who was a strong supporter of the Cultural Revolution, resembles a Jimmy Carter in his ability to appeal to both the radicals and moderates. Still, Hua 's somewhat centrist position (short on ideology, long on bureaucracy) makes him vulnerable from both sides, and he may not last a month in his bid to succeed the 82-yearold Mao.
Mao's death is sure to bring much conflict. No one person can be expected to replace him, and there is much discussion now of a collective leadership to succeed Mao. The U.S., with its vulture-like moves toward "normalization" with China, would surely gain by Mao's death, especially if the moderates and the bureaucrats, with an eye toward securing international business connections, gain the upper hand. Mao's swift move against Teng, whom Chou had rescued from the pit of disgrace, can be construed as a decisive way to guarantee an easier succession to the Chairmanship.
The denunciation of Teng appears complete, but the radicals are still not satisfied. If the more radical Politburo member Wang Hung-wen had been selected, perhaps a greater celebration might have ensued, but knowing something of the controlled nature of Chinese society- well, there's no way of telling.
The road ahead will not be easy for a country trying to uphold its leadership of the shaky Third World while neutralizing the forces of imperialism and reaction. But when we consider that China has nuclear weapons, veto power in the UN's Security Council, and all-around self-sufficiency, the future looks very promising, even guaranteed. For as many visitors have said upon returning from a stay in China: "I have seen the future, and it works!"

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Herbert Boyd teaches in the Black Studies Department at Wayne State University and edits the Newsletter of the Detroit Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

The unprecedented demonstration in the heart of Peking was unheard of, like finding pork on a Muslim's fork. Who were these upstart young turks? Was this a spontaneous expression of political dissatisfaction? A well-planned ruse by the Party to cover the expulsion of a cancerous growth? Were the radicals now in control of things?