Reaganigma
To many Americans one of Ronald Reagan's most endearing aspects is his seeming transparency. They consider him an open book, a man who speaks his mind; that his stands on the issues are distinct and resolute. This is the image he wishes to display to the world: a man of profound beliefs, who will not sacrifice his ideals to adversity or expediency.
Such a simplistic view of the Reagan persona is often at odds with the reality of his statesmanship. With the passage of time these deviations increasingly perturb and confound ally and enemy alike. To them the Great Communicator has become the unfathomable enigma.
Reagan's descent into ambiguity is a study. He built up quite a tough-guy image in the 1980 presidential campaign, and at his inauguration he served notice to America's enemies that from then on they would misbehave at their own peril. As a result, our European allies particularly viewed his ascendancy with trepidation, imagining him a sort of nuclear-armed cowboy, riding herd over the globe, ready at the slightest Commie malfeasance to unholster his ICBM's. Once in office, however, between his words and his actions there appeared a startling discrepancy.
Consider how this administration handles emergencies. The eruption of a crisis usually catches the White House staff wholly unprepared, the President often out of town or asleep. Therefore, the staff members left on watch have to decide on the initial response. The prudent thing to do would be to cali the President and his advisors in and carefully consider all the facts before taking action; but this administration believes that such was the making of Carter's Iran Hostage downfall, and so one of them picks up the nearest idealogical bone and runs with it like a mad dog. By the time the administration pulls itself together its initial tactics are well past the point of no return. As more details filter in, the staff starts to realize that its rhetoric is painting itself into a corner, but they feel that to pull back at all would constitute renunciation of their ideals, and so their fulminations become even more inflexible. Eventually they conclude that their rantings aren't getting them anywhere, and begin looking for a face-saving compromise. So a deal is made, Reagan declaring himself the winner and going on vacation, leaving the rest of the world baffled as to what all the fuss was about.
Take the Daniloff affair. The governments of western Europe agree that Daniloff has been crudely framed by the Soviets, but by no means consider it wholly unprovoked. They believe that the decision by Reagan administration ideologues to start prosecuting Russian spies instead of expelling them was a significant change in accepted procedure, sure to raise the ire of the Kremlin. Still, European editorial writers sided with Reagan, only to be utterly nonplussed when he cut a deal for Daniloff s release. As one U.K. newspaper put it, "They gave away the points of principle that they had formerly declared sacred."
The U.S. war on terrorism is another good example. Reagan talks a tough line here, painting the issue in high-contrast black and white, expressing bewilderment at the lukewarm reception given his antiterrorist proposals by the rest of the world. Other nations don't view it quite as simply as he does; the prevailing opinion is that until the root causes are addressed, terrorism will continue. Some wonder that Reagan has the gall to say anything at all on the subject, as he tolerates the most egregious acts of barbarism perpetrated by his pals in Central and South America.
On to Reaganomics. The Administration's constantly changing economic "theories" are not taken seriously by economists in other countries, especially current ideas on deficits. The President has come to the conclusion that the solution to his deficit-induced domestic economic problems is for our trade partners in Europe to stimulate their economies by increasing their money supplies (a.k.a. inflation), providing financial windfalls for their workers which they will run out and spend on U.S. goods. This is not likely to happen, as economists overseas view the rising U.S. national debt with alarm, and feel no need to risk their own economies in order to help Reagan delay the inevitable. A Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany radio) commentator described Reagan's suggestions as "arrogant," and the BBC has interviewed financial advisors who are now telling their clients to curtail investments in the U.S. Other trading partners are quite upset with the current agricultural trade war being waged by Washington, Canadian and Argentine officials complaining that after years of bluster about free trade, Reagan is "changing the rules in the middle of the game."
The upshot of these performances is that our allies have no idea of the depths of his convictions. Thus when he asks their support they are reticent to join his crusades, fearing that when push comes to shove he may well grab the only parachute, and bail out, leaving them still on board and going down in flames.
President Reagan must realize that as the nominal leader of the free world, he sets the tone of international relations. Whatever his policies, they must be coherent, so that the U.S. and her allies can deal with problems efficiently.