Nicaragua: What Happened & Why

It was about 4 am when the lines began to form for the 7 am poll openings. By 5 am, lines of up to 50 to 100 people were present around Juigalpa; and by the 7 am opening time there were 200 to 300 people standing in line at manyof the polling sites. Throughout the morning hours the lines remained very long. Participation in the election exceeded 90%--a rate of participation unheard of in the United States. People were dressed in their Sunday best and proceeded throughthe whole election process as if they were taking communion. --Ann Arbor-Juigalpa Sister Election Observation Report

Nicaragua: What Happened & Why

ed. nota: When it comes to analyzing the results of the February 25 Nicaraguan election, this much is undisputed: the election process was tree and honest, and UNO won. The following article is based on excerpts from "Mi Voto es Secreto" (My Vote is Secret), a report by the Ad Hoc Coalition of U.S. Sister Cities tor Election Observation in Nicaragua. The report represents the observations of approximately 450 delegates from 40 U.S. Sister City and state groups. While much was said in the report about the fairness and efficiency of the electoral process, this article focuses on the potitical and economic realities of a country forced by Uncle Sam to cry "uncle."

At 6:30 am on February 26, Nicaraguans awoke to the ragged voice of President Daniel Ortega Saavedra delivering a concession speech to Violeta Varrios Viuda de Chamorro, marking yet another historic first in Nicaraguan history. It ended a night which all of Nicaragua passed in quiet, but tense anxiety.

As the polls closed throughout the nation the night before, Nicaraguans were plunged into a political liminality which they had never known. Although the conventional wisdom of virtually all observers and even the parties themselves was that the FSLN would win the election handily, by 7 pm, rumors were starting to spread that the outcome might be different. Theoretically there was to be no information available until the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) began issuing its reports on the final count after 15% of the vote was recorded. This did not occur.

Around 10 pm on February 25, a U.S.-funded Honduran radio station began announcing its estimates based upon the reports of UNO poll watchers. In ever more excited voices, they detailed the story of an UNO victory. By midnight, the Honduras-based station was proclaiming thal "Violeta" was President by a landslide, and radio stations in Nicaragua were starting to report what they heard from Honduras. President Ortega's scheduled speech at midnight was postponed, and it was announced that he was in consultation with Jimmy Carter.

For those who listened to the radio and television broadcasts, Ortega's word at dawn carne as a stunning and amazing declaration, unimaginable just 24 hours earlier. It not only testified to the fairness of the election itself, but particularly to the honesty with which Ortega and the FSLN adhered to its stated democratic commitments. The speech, although delivered in an emotional, even tragic tone by Ortega, was a model of sober reflection that many, both inside and outside of Nicaragua, would not have considered possible. Ortega's gracious concession speech undoubtedly served to calm the passions of his ardent supporters.

Almost no one, including the winners, predicted the outcome of Nicaragua's elections at any level. The general mood could be characterized as one of great surprise followed by silence. There was no visible celebrating anywhere. The streets were reported empty in most areas.

Nicaraguans were able to choose among the two main political contenders, the FSLN and UNO, and a number of smaller political parties. The FSLN, the incumbent party, was founded in 1961 and led the popular uprising that in 1979 ousted the Somoza dictatorship. By far the largest and best organized party, the FSLN, often called el Frente, or Frente Sandinista, promised voters that its undisputed victory at the polls would bring a definitive and patriotic end to the contra war, allowing the nation to move forward with social programs and economic development projects that were put on hold because of the war's financial drain. The FSLN also presented itself as the best guarantor of international assistance in the wake of the elections. lts presidential ticket consisted of Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez.

UNO was founded in August 1989 as a grand coalition of 14 parties and micro-parties ranging from the Socialists and Communists on the left to the Liberals and Conservatives on the right. lts platform called for an end to military conscription, reduction of the military, elimination of state farms, and the halting of further land expropriations. Referred to by the name, La UNO, its candidates placed the blame for the war and the economic crisis squarely on FSLN "incompetence" and policies, promising voters that U.S. assistance would be forthcoming in the event of an UNO victory. Heading up its presidential ticket was Violeta Barriow Viuda de Chamorro and Virgilio Godoy, controversial leader of the Liberal Independent Party.

Nationally. the vote was 55% UNO, 41% FSLN, and the remaining 4% for other parties. In Region V, a very conservative region with much conflict because of the contra presence, there was a higher voter percentage for UNO estimated at 70% UNO to a little over 30% FSLN, with insignificant third party numbers.

In the National Assembly, 51 seats went to UNO, 39 to the FSLN, one to MUR (Movimiento Unido Revolucionario) and one to YATAMA, an Atlantic Coast Miskito Indian group allied with the PSC (Partido Social Cristiano).

In his closing campaign speech Feb. 21, 1990, Daniel Ortega acknowledged that the economy of the country was in a shambles. The causes are complex, but stem fundamentally from the direct and indirect costs of the military and economic war with the United States.

The costs of the war include: the diversion of money needed for post-revolutionary reconstruction, and agricultural, industrial, and infrastructural investments; contra attacks on and destruction of farms and farm equipment, schools, health clinics, bridges and other vital infrastructure; the human cost in lives; and refugee migration from farm to city.

Compounding this enormous pressure on the country's economy was the trade embargo imposed by the U.S. in 1985. The embargo reduced Nicaraguan exports and prevented the country from purchasing essential machinery and parts to even maintain domestic production.

The psychological devastation of 50,000 deaths in a nation whose poulation is but 3.5 million was compounded by the economic consequences to families and to the country as a whole. The loss of labor due to mandatory military service, whether or not life was lost, meant many farms had to be abandoned when the family could no longer manage the necessary work. Other farms were abandoned because farming in certain areas became too dangerous, or because contras destroyed farms and farm equipment. These effects were seen clearly in the city of Matagalpa where the population burgeoned at 75,000 people, and families moving in with other families added to already stressed household budgets.

Beginning in 1985, the Nicaraguan government was forced to impose IMF-like austerity (see NICARAGUA ELECTION REPORT, pg. 5) Nicaragua Election Report (from page one) measures. The government abandoned the centralized system of food purchases, terminated the rationing program, and froze wages. Farmers began to operate in a free market and prices to consumers and profits to farmers rose. This increased production, however, began to depress prices below the coste of production, and by early 1990 farmers were asking for a retum to the controlled prices of the centralized system.

Government austerity measures reduced the country's amazingly high annual inflation rate of 30,000% in 1988 to a monthly rate of below 10% in early 1990. But still the combination of inflation and frozen wages presented families with a difficult situation. For all its faults, which included long lines and food shortages, the rationing system had at least provided a "safety net" for the country 's poor. The end of this system, combined with free market production had in fact increased food production in the country, but people's ability to purchase food was increasingly diminished by inflation.

For example in Matagalpa, a pound of meat cost about 50,000 cordobas, slightly less than one American dollar. But the minimum wage was about $50 U.S. per month for most workers, and was as low as the $8 U.S. earned by women in domestic service. Though these wages often included meals for the worker, the rest of the average Nicaraguan family of five members had to be fed, clothed and housed directly from these earnings.

Not surprisingly, the black market also extended to durable consumer goods and worked to circumvent the U.S. trade embargo. Japanese-made electronic equipment, Honduran coffee, North American clothing and shoes, and U.S. dollars could all be purchased in Nicaraguan markets. The effects were to depress the legal market in consumer goods, circumvent an essential source of revenue to the Nicaraguan government, and incrcase the export of vital exchange dollars.

Supporters of privatization and free trade believed an UNO victory would bring an end to the U.S. embargo and an increase in goods at more affordable prices. Additionally, market venders said they believed Violeta Chamorro would follow up on her campaign promise to put an end to inflation within two weeks of her election. With a free market and no inflation, they said, prices would stabilize and profit margins would widen. There can be no question that the Nicaraguan people and the FSLN government were caught in an economic vice grip, and the intensity with which families experienced this "squeeze" was reflected in their choice for change.

The role of the United States in the Nicaraguan elections can be understood as two different parts. In support of the democratic electoral process, North American citizens constituted about half of the international observers in the country for the elecions (sic). These included, among others, the Carter team, members of the Vets for Peace, Witness for Peace, the International Human Rights Committee of the American Bar Association, and delegations from 40 Sister Cities.

In sharp contrast to the positive roles played by the European and Latin American countries, U.S. citizens, and other international observers, the U.S. govemment worked consistently and aggressively against an unbiased, democratic outcome in the Nicaragua elections. This follows the long pattern of U.S. relations with Nicaragua characterized by political, military and economic domination of that nation since the turn of the century.

As a continuation of U.S. policy, the government of the U.S. invested heavily to support opposition leader Violeta Chamorro. At least $12 million was given to UNO by Congress and channeled through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the CIA gave an additional $5 million in covert aid. Although the money seemed all but irrelevant to UNO's invisible campaign, it served several other purposes.

First, U.S. money provided the incentive for the consolidalion of the ideologically discordant parties which make up the UNO coalition. Second, it provided fodder for the opposition's planned claim of fraudulent elections. When municipal campaign offices received none of the U.S. money, local UNO candidates complained variously that the FSLN had refused to relinquish it and/or the Supreme Electoral Council was wilhholding it. Concerning the NED money, Congressman Jim Wright secured a signed statement from President Daniel Ortega which itemized its distribution. Wright was satisfied that it was handled properly by the government. Lacking any evidence of UNO's use of these millions of dollars, questions remain unanswered as to its actual application. Third, the presence of U.S. support sent a clear signal to Nicaraguans that the U.S. would change its aggressive posture toward the country after an UNO win.

This was further dramatized by the direct statements of George Bush and other U.S. officials that the embargo would be lifted and the contras disbanded if the election was won by UNO. If the FSLN won the elections, according to Secretary of State James Baker, the U.S. would have to "wait and see" before doing these things. These statements were well-publicized in La Prensa in the three days prior to the elections. In the minds of Nicaraguan voters, such a change would mean peace and economic relief after many years of unabated torment.

The United States was not alone in making donations to the Nicaraguans for electoral purposes: assistance in cash and in kind came from several western democracies including Spain, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, Canada and others. These governmental donations were aimed at supporting the impartial electoral process through the CSE and were not given to particular political interests as was the case with the United States' funding. Other political donations were made by labor unions, foreign political parties, institutes and individuals. The use of these European monies has been largely unreported in the media, with the exception of those donations (see NICARAGUA ELECTION REPORT, pg. 7)

Nicaragua Election Report (from page 5

(from Friedrick Naumann Foundation of W. Germany) which are the subject of litigation brought against UNO vice presidential candidate Virgilio Godoy for malfeasance (Nuevo Diario, 11/6/89).

The FSLN also received partisan economic support from outside sources, particularly Mexico, which backed the Sandinistas with a reported $5 million worth of propaganda and paraphernalia. Most of the caps, shirts and other specialty handouts used by the FSLN came from the Mexican government, in some ways offsetting the U.S. contributions and giving the Frente a public presence unequaled by any other party. Nevertheless, the U.S. State Department, led by Secretary Baker "burned up the wires" to pressure Sweden and other European supporters of Nicaragua to delay or reduce their assistance. The result was that Nicaragua received but a fraction of the aid it had expected (Newsweek, 3/12/90), aid which would have been targeted at alleviating some of the country's economic ills.

In summary, while claiming to support the spread of democracy throughout the world, the U.S. govemment worked to subvert the democratic process in Nicaragua's elections. Interestingly enough, during the final weeks of the campaign, there was little said about the meaning for Nicaragua of the fall of the Eastern European dictatorships. It may have been lurking in the minds of some, but in this embattled nation with its longstanding mixed economy and elections six years ago, any Eastern European analogies seemed off base.

In the end, there was unanimous agreement among observers that the electoral process in the country was fair and democratic. Unmentioned by the official observers, however, was the constant and ultimately efficacious pressure of "low-intensity warfare" exerted by the U.S. government that created a heavily weighted anchor for anyone seeking re-election.

Nevertheless, although we may describe the pressures and attempt to calculate their impact, there is of course no way to know how the election might have turned out had there been a different pattern, less polarized in character, than the political climate which reigned in Nicaragua on the eve of the election. Within two weeks however, the American government rewarded Nicaragua for their vote by lifting the economic embargo. Despite this result, it is also clear that when Nicaraguans' commitment to their social revolution and assertion of national sovereignty died, it did not do so on a level playing field.

The romance of social revolution in Nicaragua attracted crowds of well wishers, some only to applaud, others to work, some as "groupies," and others seeking to establish a less exploitative basis for international relations. Citizen diplomats in Sister City projects visited, raised money for water projects, built schools and homes, delivered garbage trucks and sent school and medical supplies to people in over 70 Nicaraguan communities. Western Europeans in 12 countries joined in this effort as willingly as Americans. Nicaragua became a kind of "Camelot." Here, internationalists could exercise their ideals, both despite and because of the climate of war created by the U.S. government's support for the military overthrow of the FSLN government and the accompanying economic embargo.

Today, the circumstances which led to the development of all of this effort have dramatically changed. It is still too early to know what the character of the Chamorro-Godoy govemment may be, and the nature of its future development efforts are not defined. What remains constant, however, is Nicaragua's place in the configuration of poverty in Central America and its great dependency on external resources.

As the various nations prepare to readjust their foreign assistance programs to meet the new situation in Nicaragua, Sister City programs will also need to re-evaluate their own activities. Nicaragua's human needs are as urgent as ever. Social and political reconciliation after the bitter agony of the past fifteen years will require a mature and humane leadership and spirit. With the Nicaraguan desire for peace and tranquility, it seems likely that there will be ample opportunity for person-to-person and city-to-city programs of a truly humanitarian quality to continue their work in pursuit of international goodwill.

Ann Arbor-Juigalpa Sister City Election Observations by Kurt Berggren

The nine-member Ann Arbor Sister City Election Observation delegation was in Nicaragua from Feb. 16 to March 1, mainly in our sister city of Juigalpa, whichis the principal city in Chontales, or Region V.

The delegation also spent time attending meetings, interviews and political rallies in Masayam Managua and Santo Tomas. We observed the electoral process and interviewed voters, representatives of the political parties, candidates, election officials and other election observers. We were officially certified by the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), thus allowing us complete access to all aspects of the electoral process.

Ann Arbor was one of 40 U.S. sister cities that formed a coalition to send delegations to their Nicaraguan sister cities as election observers. The coalition of sister cities agreed to act cooperatively and issue a joint report; and the conclusions in the Coalition of U.S. Sister Cities report are similar to the conclusions reached in the report prepared by the Ann Arbor delegation.

Our conclusions are as follows:

1. The Nicaraguan people were provided with a free and honest election process that was a model of efficiency and fairness; and they embraced this chance at participatory democracy as though it were a religious ceremony.

2. While the elections were technically free, fair and honest, they were not fair in the very real sense because of U.S. intervention through a strategy of low-intensity warfare.

3. Nicaraguans voted to relieve the pressures that had been applied by U.S. interventionist policy--the war and the economic crisis. Consequently, the U.S. controlled the agenda and the issues and effectively denied the people their freedom of choice.

4. The FSLN and the Supreme Electoral council conducted themselves admirably in ensuring that particpatory democracy worked and that the electoral proces was free, fair, open and honest.

5. The voter registration process worked flawlessly.

6. Although there were some incidents of violence and abuses of electoral laws during the campaign period, the 80-day campaign period was relatively fair and free from serious intimitation and the people were able to participate and express political beliefs.

7. The high degree of participation--over 95% registration and over 90% voting--indicates an eagerness of the people to embrace and participate in the democratic process.

8. Despite its defeat, the FSLN remains the strongest and best organized political party in Nicaragua. The FSLN will remain a powerful political opposition force in the new government.

9. There was no vote splitting evident; and the UNO victory encompassed the National Assembly and municipal elections as well as the presidential election, all with virtually the same percentage.

10. Although there were allegations of improper use of U.S. money to buy votes, there was no way to determine how the massive influx of U.S. money for UNO was utilized in the absence of any accounting or record-keeping system.

11. The numerous international election observer teams, including those of the sister cities, were somewhat intrusive on one level, but on another and more important level, were helpful in legitimizing the electoral process and the outcome.

12. The FSLN, much slandered in the U.S. as being dictatorial, Marxist, authoritarian and the like, exhibited a real commitment to democratic principles before, during and after the elections.

13. The sister city relationships will be encouraged to continue despite the possibility that the new local government may be less receptive to the sister city concept. The sister city relationships are much more important than ever in this time of monumental change in Nicaragua. We will continue to work for the same goals we have always supported--friendship, peace, social justice and mutual respect and understanding.

Whether the election was "democratic" essentially turns on one's definition of democracy. It certainly wasn't democratic in the sense of the Nicaraguan people havinga free andfair choice. The United States manipulated and controlled, through its program of low-intensity warfare, the key issues--the war, the draft, and the economy--so that the Nicaraguans, for all practical purposes, had no choice but to vote against the incumbent party. Since the party that the U.S. government officially backed, both economically and militarily, won the election, it was a "democratic" election in the U.S. government's eyes.

The difficulties that lie ahead for Nicaragua must now be solved by a ruling coalition "party" made up of 14 different political parties with no policies and no agreement among themselves. They feace the seemingly impossible task of "integrating" into society contra soldiers who for almost 10 years have had no other occupation than killing.

However, there are also some hopeful signs. The Sandinistas, with over 40% of the vote, are sill the largest and most organized force in the country and have the potential to control the National Assembly and keep UNO from acting to dismantle positive programs. The embargo has been lifted and the economy might very well improve with the influx of U.S. money. The danger lies in a more aggressiverole by the U.S., which could lead to a destruction of the gains of the revolution, a return of the dreaded National Guard and death squads and ultimately a full-scale civil war if those in power become vindictive and attempt to crush the former ruling party. Those of us who have gone to Nicaragua to help, to support programs that aid the poorest people, and to report truthfully on what was going on there will continue to go and care.

Ann Arbor-Juigalpa Sister City Status Fluid by Gregory Fox

The Ann Arbor-Juigalpa Sister City Committee met shortly after the Nicaraguan election in what was possibly our biggest meeting. While recognizing that there were bound to be changes in the relationship due to the change in government, there was no question about remaining, involved with Juigalpa.

In the past the Ann Arbor-Juigalpa Sister City Committee has materially supported health and education projects in Juigalpa. We hope to continue, working in cooperation with Nicaraguan organizations. It remains to be seen whether the UNO administration will prove a suitable conduit for aid from Ann Arbor. They will be receiving generous support from the U.S. government, so we will be interested to see how that aid is handled.

The situation in Nicaragua in relation to all of its sister cities is going to be fluid for the next several months, so our plans will remain general. It is possible that the incoming national UNO administration will be hostile to the sister cities, although on the local level they have indicated a desire to maintain this relationship. Due to the diverse nature of the UNO coalition, we expect contradictory announcements on this and other issues. We may choose to work with progressive non-government groups, such as church organizations or perhaps, AMNLAE, the national women's group. These organizations could well prove better at protecting the social gains of hte past 10 years.

For now, we will make efforts to establish good relations with the new UNO-dominated city council in Juigalpa and will continue to follow developments in Nicaragua closely. We do have some specific areas of concern:

Medical Care: Since the revolution in 1979, free medical care has been available to the general population. The Ann Arbor-Juigalpa Sister City Committee has taken medical supplies to Juigalpa, and recently, in cooperation with World Medical Relief, Nicaragua Medical Aid Project, and Interfairth Council for Peace and Justice, sent $500,00 worth of medical supplies, UNO is talking about privatizing the medical system. We are concerned that this could mean a return to the pre-revolutionary period when only the wealthy had access to medical care.

Education: This is another area where, with community support, the Ann Arbor-Juigalpa Sister City Committee has provided material aid. Reducing illiteracy has been a major accomplishment of Sandinista government. As with health, we will bewatchingto see if there is a regression to pre-revolution standards.

Land Reform: UNO is making promises to both sides on this issue--assuring campesinos that they can keep the land they have gained since the revolution, but also saying that land "inappropriately confiscated" will be returned to the former land owners. Quite possibly there will be a de facto revocation of land reform, using market forces to remove small farmers from their land, similar to the mechanics that are pushingU.S. farmers off their land.

The Ann Arbor-Juigalpa Sister CityCommittee meets on the second Thursday of each month at 7:30pm in the basement library of First Baptist Church.