The Progress Of The Great European Drama

The great huropean drama adrances witii ven and nieusured strides toward its oohaumrnation, and the entranco of Garibaldi into the Neapolitan capital has coincided with an event of perhaps equal sigüificance ia the development of' the spectaole. Austria and Russia are once muro allies. The Emperor Alexandor bas anuounced his 'sincere desire lor a perfect reconciliatiou" with the Emperor Josepu, aud measures, we learu; are to be instatitly taken for terininating the estrnngements between these two sovereigns which has beeonie " no longer tolerable." There should be nothing on the face of this intelligeuce to créate either surprise or suspieiou. It is as good for crowned heads as fur others to dweil together in unily, and it is fortúnate for the world whcn its rulers are at peace. But does the new alliance bespeak nothing beyond the resumption of those terina of aniity which it is now dis.overed ''ought never to have been interruptcd." Has it no coiijition arising out of tlie present state of Europe ? These are questious of grave iniportauee, and naturally suggestive of grave conjeetures. The ürst iuipression likely to bo produced on the public miad will be connected with the advance of Garibaldi, and the peril conse.jUL'iitly inipending over the Austrian dominions. The Italian Liborator is not o.ily oxpected to give freedom to Venetia, but is supposcd to be reckcn ing on the insurreetion of Hungary in aidof his desigas. If Austria has the Italiaus on her hands in the Venetiau proviuces, can she cope with an anny of patriota on the l'heiss ? It is but eleven years ago thut Austria, though viet;rious in Lombardy, found herself utterly unable to subdue the people of Hungary, who had risen against her rule, aud it is reasonable to iofvr that what she failed to achieve theu, she would be incompetent, uuder less favorable circumstances, to accomplish now. But it will be also recollected to what expedient, when thus en dangered, the Imperial government recurred. The Court of Vieuna concluded a couveution with tho court of St. Petersburg, in virtue of whieh a Russian army marebed into Hungary and by its intcrveutiou preserved the crownofSt. Stepheu for the Austrian Emperor. With so very modera a precedent before us, tlién, it would be hard to avoid a suspicion that a suddeu alliance between Austria aud Russia provides anew for the security of Huugary against. rnenaces, which besides beiug formidable to the authority of one Ewperor, are by no menos agreeable to the traditional policy of tho other. If these however, are the arrangemonts now in prospect, we can only say that they are certainly ili-timed, and will probably prove abortivo. Short as is the interval between 1849 and 1860, it has been long enough to put an end to those principies on wnich the last iutervention proceeded. Non-intervention is now the maxim of the day. The appearance of thheRussian anny either in Italy or Hungary would not be to the satisfaction of Europe, nor we may safely add, to the advantage of Russia herself. Hardly in fact, has sho yet recovered from her indignation and auger at the "huge ingratitude" with whioh her last favors were received. Those favors did little good to either side. It was because Austria recovered Hungary by this vicarious conquest that she treated the Hungarians as a conquercd people, and provoked that very disaflectiou which alarms her uow, It was because Russia got suyh small thauks for her assistance, and suoh poor returns in her own hour of need, that the estraugement occurred between the two courts which is ceasing only at this very time. Certaiuly, neither Power oan be under auy tcmptatiou to enact sueh a passage over again. The conditkms too, of tho case are now materially changed. At the former period, Austria liad Sardinia. alone to deal with on the bauks of the Po. fche has now to face all Italy by Üardinia's side, and a power more formidable still behiud Sardinia's back. The counsels of the French Emperor are insurutable, but it is by no means eertain that the Emperor Napoleon would patiently submi1 to the interfcrence of another State in the Italian struggle, and if the alliauce of llussi on the one side is balanced by the hos' ü- ity of France on the other, it can hardly be thought that Francis Joseph would gaiu by the transaction. Botter far would it bo to create coufidjnce at home than to look for these ill-omened succors from abroad. Tho most successful intcrvention of foreign armics would fail in giviug aay real stability to the Austrian throne. That position can only bc acquired by such government as removes disaffection, aud such anadministratiou as produces coutent. The Iiuugarians them selves are at this moment suggesting the best eourso which the Austriau Emperor could adopt. They ask for nothing but their rightful constitution under Franois J ose;jh, thcir King. They acknovvl.edge themselves bis subject but only on the ancient aud original conditions between crown and peopie. Tbey desire no other ruler, if he will rule them according to law. If he will but restore Hungary to itself, the kingdom will be his own, and will no longer offer any standing ground either for Garibaldi or the Czar. We rejoice to observo from our iatest talegrams that thif pMiy leomi to bc npproving aelf at Vienna, and if that should be aotually tho oourie of affaire, the Kussian allianco will either be supwfluous or must receive souie now iijterpretation, Anothov iaterprotation it will not be difficultto fiad Already the Austrian government bas thought it noeessay to dis:laiui tho intentiou of joining a coalition agaiust France, and already lias it declarad that its alliancos witli other pow ers are only to bü understood as the natural reauinption of frieudly ivLitions with the Chief States of Europa Tlia termn of tho contradictiou expresa with suffioient perspxuity the nature of tho impression prevailiug. Austria, as the Power ehiefly iujurud by tLo warliko policy of Franoe was to take advantage of the epidemie of distrust to place herelf at tho fiead of a coalition, aud to secure ia this inanuer, through the coinmon apprehensions of Europe, au aetivity of svinpathy whieh slie taiied to obtaiu in her own proper cause. We canuot pretend to deay the plausibility of these views. Afterthe declaratious made by our own Ministers in Farliament after the ominoua hiuts throwa out just a fortnight ago by a continental journal presumed to spoak the suntimeuts of tho Russian Couit, after the interview nt Toplitz, and after the uueasy mnnnurs of Europe, it would be impossible to do ny that the reeent poliey of Franco has get all states ahkeuponreoonsideringtheir eouuectious and placing tht'ir houses in order. The annexation of Savoy gave a new aspect to the Italian war a:id a now moral to the cainpaign. As long as Frauce was thought to have gone to war " for an idea," Europe remaiued tolerably easy, but when she appeared tohavegone to war for a proviuoe, the ca3e was suddenly altered, and what had been inerely Austria's difficulty beoame every body's danger. If this, therefore, rathcr than the tbi'mer interpietation, should be the solution given to the tidinga uow announced, we could foei no surprise. We retaiu, however, an uushaken convictiou that the simple poliey of non-intervention will be the best for all states alike. The diiys ure gono by for a coalition agaiust Fraace as completcly as for au intervention against Huugary. Any such eoalition as that suggested. unless it were vigorously contined to mutual guáranteos asainst aggressiou, would end by placing Franee at the head of liberalism against absolutism in a war of opinions. Any intervention in Hungary would give an mdefinite and sanguiuary extensión to that revolution wlnch, with universal syrapathy and with little bloodshed, is now advaneing to its end. The on!y safe interventiou is that which Franeis Joseph eau immediately exercise on hia own behalf. Let him step betwoen Kis Ilungu rian subjects and their misguiding governors, let him once more givo Hungary its national iustitutioiis; and he niny then, secure on his throne, await the shock of arms in Venetia, with the conviction that at aoy rate, he has little to lose.