Removed

- Hon. E. Marvin, late 17. S. Judge at Key Wes', has made his threats that ho would not recognize the adiniralty jurisdiotion of the Kepilblio of Florida, and that every citizen of our State who, ai'ter its secession, rofused to recognizo ihe la.vs of the United States should be treated as a traitor. - Tho Governor has aceordinajlv very properly and promptly removed hiin. and sppointod S. R. Mallory Admiral-y Judge in his stead. - Fernandina Rast Fluí idian. jL-Lr At best, life is'tiot vory long. A few more srniles, a few more tears, innch pain, sunshine and song, clouds and darknesa, hasty groetings, abrupt farewells - then our little play will close, i and injured and injurer will pass away. It ia worth while to hate each other. Minority Report of the House Judciary Committee on the Personal Liberty LawsThe minority of tho committfo on the Judioiary, to whom was referred petitions f oi the repeal of tho Personal Liberty laws, so called ; also, a bilí to repeal seclions two, three and four of an act entitled an act to protéet the rigbts and liborties of the nhabïtants of this Stato, approved Fobrnary 13 1855 ; also, a bilí to ainend section 25 of ehapter 150 of the Revised Staüites of 1840, being sec. 5,735 ot the Cornpiled Laws, as amemled by act No. 189 of the Session Laws of 1859, report as iollows : That they have been disposed to give the subjeet referred to thern that serious consideraron which belongs to it under tho circuinstanees in vvhieh it is now presontod, and while tho undersigned regrct that tho repeal or nonrepeal of theso lawa has boen, as we believc, most unwarrantably sought by some to be made a que.stion of partij. we shall not be deterred by any such considerationa from meeting tho question upon its merits. If these laws are to be repealed, it must be either beoauso tbey contravone some provisión of tho constitution of the United States or of the Stato, or because they are inexpodient and unwiso, or wrong in their spirit and teodeaoy. On page 413 of the laws oí 1855, act No. Iü2, we find ' Au aot to p rot eet the rights and liberties of the inhabitünts of thirf State,' tho first seotion of which makes it tho duty of tho Prosecuting Attornoy of eaoh county, wheu aoy inlabitant of this State is arrested or Jiaimed as a fugitivo slave, on being nformed tbereol, diligently and faitbully to use all Jawful means to protect md defend such person. To this proision, in itseif considered, we do not eo thut aDV constitutional or other obection can be fair]}' mado. It is no more than a humana provisión to pro .eet the rights of those who raay be unawfully arrestad. The next three sections provide that all persons so arrested and claimed as 'ugitivo sla vea shall be entitled to the jenefits of the wnt of habeat corpus and of trial by jury ; and thai, if the writ )f habeat corpus be sued out in vacaion, if upon the hearing the porson im irisoned, arrested, or claimed as a fu jitive slave shall not be discharged, he hall be entiüed to an appeal to the Ciruit Court of the county in whioh such learing ahall have Sen had, in furnishng batl, &c, ; and that the court to which euch appeal hall bo taken, or to vhicb such wnt of habeas corpus is reiirnable, shall, on npp]icat:on of either Jarty to the proceedings, direct a trial )y jury on all questions offact in issue i such proceedings In the third subdivisión of sec. 2 of rticle IV. of the constitution of the United States, it is provided : ' That o pereon held to service or labor in ne State uüder the laws thereof, ecaiing into another, shall, in consequence fany law or regulation therein, be dis. hargedfrom such service or labor ; but hall be delivered up on claim of the pary lo whom such service or labor ma 1 be luc,} which provisión ot the coostituion Congress intended to carry out by heact of February 12, 1793, 'or haper 51 (7,) which provides a mode oí making the claim, and the prooi" that abor and service is due, and a tribunal iefore which the claim and proof is to a made, and the provisions of which re sufficiently familiar to rnake the eiiation unnecessary; and still further by he fugiüve slave law oí 1850. This onstitution was adopted but twelve eara after the Declaration of Indejendence, and at a time whon slavery xisted, to a greater or loss extent, ia 11 the States oí the Confederacy, out whon many of' them were taking" teps 'or its gradual abolition, to which, as a esired consummation, those eminent atriots and irue statesmen of the time, George Washington. James Madison, nd Thomas Jufferson, laborod wjih an arnest desire to 8ee accomplished as oon as it could w'th Píifety be done. In many of th State?," however, his could then not be aceoinplinhed. 3y law of nations, and by common law, he state of si ayer ƒ is considered as a mere municipal regulation, limited to the range of the laws of the jurisdiction vvhere it exists ; and no State wns jound to reconize the condition of lavery as to foreign siavas íound withn it.s territorial liinits. The clause of the constitution above ited becarno, therefbre, neeessarv ondition precedent to the adherence of hose Statos to the Union wliich did not contémplate, from any cause, ihe epeedy abolition of slavery. Now, if this clausö, or the laws passed by Oongress to carry it into effect in pursuance of it, could be rondered ineffectual or hindered by State legislation, thcn, so Jar forttí the constitution vou!(l be nullified. In the langaage of Mr. Juntice Story, in the uaso of Pi'igg ij. PeniiMylvania, 16 l'eters' Eeport, p. 612, deÜvered in 18-12 : " The clause inanifestly contémplales lie existenoa of a positive unqualified ight on the part of tho owner of the lave, which no State law can in any vay qualify, regúlate, control or re train. rtie wlave is not to bo discharged from serioe or labor in eonsequenee of any State law or regulation. Now, oertainy, without indulgjng in any nicety of criticisrn upon words, it may fai rij and reasonably be eaid that any State law r Stato regulation [we arestill quoting Judgo Story's wórdt] which interrupts, imits, delays or postpones tho riglits of ,he owner to the inmediata poisession of the sliivo and tho mmediate comnand of his service and labor, operates iro'anto a discharge ot the slave thorerom. " Congress having tindertaken to próvido for carrying out this provisión of Ao Conetitutioo, and its action beingin conformity with tho provisions of the Constitution, as has been repeatedly decidcd in the State Conrts of B4assa chusütts, New York and Pennsylvanin, and in evory court in iho Ui.ited States whero it has boon called in quostion, it jecomes a question how far the States can properly legislate upon the samo subject It may bo conceded thnt upon some Bubjects Congress has concurrent power of legialation with the States. But on this subJBct of the recapture of fugitivo elaves, it would eeetn necessary Ihat Congress should possess sole jutisdiction of the subject. First, because the power exists on!y by virtuc o[ the Constitution of the United States, and is there for tho first (me rocognjzed as an absoluto du tv throughout tlio ontiro Union. As Mr. Jnstice Story remarks in the case beiore reierrad to, "Itie, in a just sense, a new and a positiva rigbt, independent of coinity, confinod to no territorial limit, and bounded by no State institutions or polioy." And again, ': Jt would be a Rtrunge anomaly and forced construction to suppose that the National Goverument maant to rely for tho due fulfillment ot its own proper rights and duties, and the rights which it intended to secara, upon State legialation, and not upon the Union.'1 A fortiori, it would be moreobjectionable to suppose that a power that was to be the saine thrbughout the Union, should be conti(Jed to State sovereignty, which could Dot rightfully act beyond its own territorial limita. Secondly, the nature of the power and the objects sought to be attaiüed ronder it uecessary that it should be exeroiscc! and controllod by the sume wil!, and that uniform regula"tions should exist over the entiro Union. If the States have the right of Legislation on this subject each State will adopt its own policy, prescribe its own rules and forpis, acocordiog to the feelings and perhaps prejudieesoí its peo pie, aod the laws ot one State may be i;i direct conliict with and wholly incon■ietent with those of another. "W herever," saya Chief-Justice Marshall in the case of Sturgis vs. Crowningshield, 4 Whcaton's Rep. 122, "the terras in which a power is granted to Congrcss, or the nature of the power, require that it should be exercisod oxclusively by OoDgreas, the subject is as ]y taken iVom State Legislatures as if they had been forbidden to act.'' 'I'he Supreme Court of the United Suites, therel'ore, in the case of Brigg Pi, Pennsylvania, in 1852, the opinión oí thu court being rendered by Justice Siory, of Massachusetts, and concurred in, as to its raain oonclusions, by Judges Thompson and Baldwin, ai] three of whorn are departed frorn tho conflict ol the present day, and by Cnief Justice Taney, Justice McLean, and Justice Daniel, dec.ded, on these grounds, that the act oí Pennsylvania of 1820, entidad " an act to give effect to tho proviaiona of the Constitution of the United States relativo to fugitivos l'rom labor, for the protection of i'ree people of color, and to prevent kidnapping," under which Prigg was arrested and indicted, for rbclaiming and carrying into Maryland a fugitive slave, under the provisions of the Constitution and act of Congres, without conformiag to the provisions of the State luw, was uneonstitutional and void ; the majority of the court holding that tho power of legislation in relation to lugiüvos frorn labor is exclusive in thu national Congress, and that no State :an pass any law on the subject. In tliis Justice Story and McLean agree, white Chief Justice Taney and J ustico Thompson held that the States might enact laws on this subject which did not impair the right, but none which itnpeded or hindered re capture ; but all agreeing that the points docided do notinteriere with the polico power of the State to arrest and nnprison fugitives from labor, to guard agaiast their depredations or misconduct, or to punish themfor crimes committed in the States where found. - All the Judges coneurred that the constitutional provisions on this subject was a fair compromise, the Southern States agreeing on their part that tho mportation of elavos into the United States should be prohibited after 1808. We inay reniark, in passing, in view of this last consideraron, that it behooves the freo States to be cautious about intringing upon their part of thebargain. The Supreme Court of the State of New York auuounoed the same doctrine unanimously in 1834-, in the case of Jack is. Martin, 12 Wend':ll's Bep., 312, in wbich the constitutionality oí the law of that State providing tor the writ de homine replegiando, writ for replevymg a man, as against the agent or person claiming a fugitive slave, came directly in question. That court declarod that the law ol the United States enaeted to earry out the confeti tutional provisions, the Gonstitution boing conceded to be suprome, " must be paramount Irom neeessity to avoid the contusión of adverse and conüicting legislation ; that so far as the States are concerned, the power, when thus exètoised, is then exhausted ; and, though, they might have desired difi'er erom legialatioü on the eubjcct, they amend, qtiahfy, or in an;i manner alter it ;" that " the principie undoubtedly is esêential to tho peace and harmony of tbc two governments." Our ovvn Supreme Court, six years since, unanimously declarod the'samo doctrino, except that ia that case tlio power of legislation was concurrent and not exclusive, being not in a slave caso, but no less conclusivo for that feoapfl on principie. The act of Gongress uf 1S50 provides that rnortgages on enrolled and licensed vessels sliall bö recorded in the effioe of Collector oí Guítoiüs of the proper district. The Stato law ot 1846 provides that all chattel mortgages shall be recordad in the oifice of the Town Clerk. The act of CongTaBS is authorized, as all agree, under the clause in the constitution pioviding that Congres may regúlate eomuHTce, &e. The court agreod that the State law, so far as it was inconsistent with tho act of Congrass, must y Leid. The samo principies aro nlso abundantly doclared in various cases arising upon statu tes on various subjectsia the State and United States cours. Jtit it would seem that the plain languago oí the constitutional provisión in (juestion, " That no person held to labor in one State under the laws tbereof, esoapinginto another, shall, in consoquenoo ol' any law or regulation tlerein, bo discharged l'rom such service or labor," can hardly be uitstaken by a cundid miiid. Now, those sections of tbe statutes of Michigan, of 1855, proposed by the bill rel'enod to the committoe to be repe:led, provides for a different mode of trial froni either of the acts oí Congress framed in accordance with thie constitutionsl provisión, and provide, as did the laws of Pennsylvania and New York in the c.isos above referred to, for transferring the case froin the authorities provided by the act of Congross to a tribunal of iis own. Now, ii a fugitivo bo discharged under the , habcas corpus or on njury trial, wha had boon taken unik:r the act of GongreM, ia he Dot discharged from servico or labor in consequonee of the law of lliis State into which he has fled ? We thiiik ït is olear that heis. The undersigncd cannot, iherefore, resist the conclusión that these sections of the act last reierred to are unconstitutional. .and shouM for that roason, jf no other bo repealcd. Bnt it bas recently boen claimed that this law was not enacted ior tho purpose of preventing or hindering tlie arrest of fugitivo slaven. What else coulct have been ita objoct, judging from its provisions, its language, and the circuinstances? For any other purposes of personal liberty, the punishing of kidnapping of our own eitizens, ampie provisión were already in our Btatuto book. The known and inovitablo operation of the act, if cnrried out, must be to prevent the rendition of fugitive slaves; and we can only judge of the intent of an act by its neeessary consequences, unless the taw-makers have oiherwife spodficaüy declurei their intent. But, in this instance, we are not left wholly in the dark on this point, so far, as the declara. ions oí n committeo of the last Legislature on Federal Rolations are concerned, when this subject was before thera. They distinctlr declare in their report that ''The act of' Februnry 10, 1855, was designed, and if faithfully executed, will accomplish the object'' for which the petitioners pray in one of the petitions referred to thorn, whieh, as the report statcs, was for the passage of a law "to prevent tho delivering tjp of fugitiva slaves." [House jaarna] of 1858, p. 527.] There was no other occasion for the enactment of those sections. It was a fully recognized priooiple of American as well as English common law that every slave who sutshis feet on our soil becomes there by free, and it is only by operation of the clause of the constitution we have recited, and the law passoil in pursuance of it, that a slave can reinain such on our soil, and under that pro visión only vvhen he is a íugitive and reclaimed acoording to its provisions, Such a law, too. being, as we have shown, wholly utinecessary any practical purpose, except it'be intended to interiore witb the remandmg of fugitivo slavos, was extremely inexpedient and unwiso in its origin, but under present ciroumstanees,' it becomes, in our judgment, obs'inate persistence in wrong to retain it on the statute book. We say persistence in wrong-, beoause the provisious of the law we have recited are uneonstitutional, and because it is wrong to retain an unnecossary law, which is the occasion of ill-feeling, discord and strife both among our own people, and be tween ourselves and sister States of thisConfederacy. We, therefore. onbestitatingly reaotnmend tbattheseoond. third and fourth saotions of the act of 1855, referred t, be repealed. The amendment made by net 189 of the laws of 1859 to sëetion 25 of' chapter 153 of the Revised Statuto-? provides that every person "who shull bring any negro, mulatto, or other person into the State, claiming hira or her as a slave, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State Prison not more than ten, year, or by fioe not exceeding one thousand dollars.1' This provisión, so far as it próvidos a punishment for an act which in sorae cases is lawful acuording to tho elaase of the constitution and act of Congress we have referred to, cannot be sustained. A fugitive slave from Missouri may be taken in New York or in Ohio, under the act of Congress, and re manded, and the usual and naiural roüto for his return would be through this State. And, should the person having him in charge, under the certifioate granted under the act of (Jongress, bo met by a inisehief-maker, of whora there are too ir,a;iy, and asked if the negro was a slave, and should reply affirmatively, he would thus be claiming him to be a slave, and, according to the plain letter of the law of 185U, above recited, would be rendered liable to ts penalties. Suoh a law, aocording to the principies before adduced, nd supported by the cases Oltedj cannot be cwnstitutional 60 far torth. Uut it is said the courts would not apply the act to such a case - they would uold that such was not the intent of the act. Wh-it, then, wr.s its inteni? Tho i'ommon-sense and statutory rule of construction oí laws, as laid down in section 'd oí chapter 1 of the Revised Statutes, boing section 2 of the Gompiled Laws, in the first subdirision of that section, is asfollows: "All words and phrases eball be construed according to the common and ipproved ueage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as havo acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, sháll be coiistrutid and aoderatocd accordiog to such peculiar and appropria.e meaning." 8uch a rulo is necessary for public safoty. ÏIjü peoplo at large are lawyers, and naturally expect and betiove thüt laws they are calied upoa to obey meao what they express. This ruk; haa never boen relaxed by the courts of last resort in cases of ooofloit between State and United States laws, and in no otLer case, exeept occasionally whea cüurta wish to avoid a hard oonsequence of a general rule, and, aa they tliink, in order to attain justice in a particular cas";, construe a atatute to mean what they judge i: ehould be made to moan. Agaia, thero was no OCcaaioD for suoh na amendment to the statute for any other purpose No o:ie could voluntarily bring and retain a slave in this State by our law as it pruviously btood. Why,then, attoiupt to punish as a crime mtrely to claim a negro to be a slave when itis impossibla to make that claim a reali y without inourrinj a penalty previously enactod? It has been said that this umendmoiit was malo to avoid tha elioct of tho principies annouuced by some oí the. Judgea of the Supremo üourt of the Uuited States in thu Dred Scott case, under xyhioh it was foared that slavory could bo establislied in Michigan, and such seenjs to havo beon the motive ' power applied to tho commiitee of this House who, in 1859, reported the amendment iu quostion. [Seo journul of 1859, p. 527.] We do not hold ourselves bound, uor does any court, by the atrocious doctrines so ajmounqed by the judges, which wero wholly out-. sido of tlio case bcíoref thcm, or of tbe puint íipon which they professedly ■'1 that case. So far as thu opinions in that case are beyond tin case itscil', they wero mern política! doouninnts. We might bo dispoaed t give tbern the weight of opiüicma of good lawyere, did they not bear tho carroarks of partisanship, Uut supposi these opinions to bo faw. Then thev aro congtructions oí tho eonstitution and act oí Congres, and, so far as tho law of 1859 ia opposed to thetn, it is as nnconstitutinnnl as it i in the view wo h.ivo belore taken. Tbe laws of the United States must neither be resisted nor nullifted in this matter by loyal States. It ill becomes us, who mates charge of tmllifioation and treason agaioss the seceding States, to tako sueh u st.ep. We should clear our owp skirts of all auspicien of complicity with nullification in the present crisis, and thus take avay every just grouud of complaint. If, when wo bave done this, our Southern brethren still persist in their mad íchemes of rebelliou and civil ísar, we have but to meet the issue like rnen who daré be free ; but uni.il then we cannot do it with clean hands or pure he-arta, neither could we indulge the hope that the God of battles would smile upoo. our cause. And novv, in cDncluding this report, for the sake oí eonfirming the view we entertained and of satisfying roma who bave expresad a desire to know what wero tho opinions of the Judges o the Supreme Courtof this State on tho subject we have dtêcuswd, we will eiïibody aomo extracta from letters froni three of the gentlemen who occupy, soats on that beneh writton, to be t-ure, as private eidzens, who havo a right to have, and express their viewn, and which, although not of binding forcé, are certainly evidence of their views as lawyers, and entitled to great respect. Chieí Justiee Martin 8yí : " I regard the law oí 1855 both unn-cessary, as the comilón law iffords ampio protection to the citizens if illegally arrest, ed, and unconstitutiona, as infringing upon the jurisdiction of Oongress, which I hold to be exclusiva upon the subject of the arrest and restoration of. ' fugitivos from labor;' and I regard. tb at of 1859 as unconstitutional in so far as it renden penal, without quaüfiication, an act which, in many cases, is made lawiul by the constituyen and lans of the United States, and as certoinly contrary to the spirit of tho consiitution." And, again, he continúes : " Why should t be made a penal ofFense to raerely claim that which it i impossible to make effectual without incuiring a liability aJready provided tor ? ' And, again : " Tho difference ietween the nullification oí a law of Conerress and seuossion is not so verv wide that we can with justice condemo, the ono if we are ourselvos guilty of theother.'' Says Judge Campbell, in another let; : " When tho Constitution of the United otates places any subject under the cantrol of the legislativa or othor_ authority of the Union, it is either removed entiroly from the province o( State legislation, or (n casus whero concurrent power may be proper'j exercised,) exempted lrom the opration of any unñiendly aclion. Whon Con;;ress has once acted upon such a subject, no Stato can interiore with the Oongreasional action.:' Spaaking t Lhe case of Prigg vu Pennsylvaaia, we bave cited, Judge Gampball says : " I thiuk that decisión is not onf y binding, bat is rigil in principie." Again,he says: Our statutes do not inernly egislate upon the saina subjeets with, the act of Congres.-!, but they ar) plainly inconsistent with those aots, The CoDStltution plainly. and the aoU oí' Congress expressly contémplate that a claim to fugitives shall be disposed of more sirnply and speedily than suits in the ordinary course of legal proceedingf, whicli may be protracted indefinitely. When afugdive isarrested under the act of Congrcss, no State Aas nny right or power to inte, f ere with the pruceediugs. They are under the control, and therefore under the protection. solely ofathe United States ; nor ha.a any State the right to interpose obsta-, cles in the way oí a lawful arrest, which will vexatioubly delay or impedfl it." Again, in refwrriiig to the claim muda by some that these laws may be allow ed to' stand for proper purposea, and that, il vuid as to uthers, there is no need of their repeal, he save that, " When a oourt declares a thing plam-, ly vvithjn the languago of a statute to be exernpt from iba operatioq, becauaa if e.nbraccd t iv.mld reader thel.iw unconsti;utional, it is merely a roundabout way oí declaring that the law is invalid. The meaning of a statute is not allowed to be gatbered from outsida aources. Those who adopted it may have differed very vvidely in the;r yiowsi of its effect. It is not to bo presumed . that any hor.est man would knowingty violato bis oath. And no explanation or declaratioD, in any forin, can alter the meaning which the wordsfainy express." " Should such legislation be permitted to stand ? I thiuk not. - When-attentibn has boen culled ta iny existí ng abuso, those who pennit it tó . oontiaue are justly held responsible, n the ovos of all men, for its further oontinuance." " To subject the Statu to tho imputation of nulitication, is to expose our honor." Judge Christiancy, in another letter on this subject, saya : " The abstradt quostiou, whother thosa laws are micoustUutional, is of no practical mportanoe - it is a mere abstraotion ; for suoh is tb.3 peouliar nature of tho case, thafc tho praottcal effect of either ocmstructiou is the same - the one holding that it does r,ot ooutain a particular provisión, the olher tliat it does contain that provisión, but that such provisión is void, aud thoreforo in eöect tho same as if it had never boen, insorted. 13ut while thoso acts remaia upon the statute book, unaltered, uutil decidod upon by the court of last resort, they will continue to havo all the p,r:iofceal effect of uncoaatitutional laws. They nre calculatod to create doubts and to load to litigation. Thaií èiï'act is algo the same upon tlio publio ruind, both ad th(} North and at tho South. For te tho -- ■;■- ular apprefaension all laws will be under stood to oporato to their litoral oxtont. And again, the s.aine gentlora.in remarks : - "In such a contest as that v.i aro now entering, we should uot only bs, but we should ako appear to be, olearly in the right," Agaiu, in speaking of the act of 1859, he says : " I cannot doubt that truth, utice, and sound policy equally requiré that the acts in question should bo so modified as to bri'ig the:n clearly and oxprcssly within the Federal constitution.'' Judge Ohristiancy reachos this conclusión by a different road frqtq the other two Judges from whose lotters wc havo, extracted, but he arrees at the samft pcint - tho repoal or modiöeation of theso laws. Theso k-ttors, of course, are uot cited as binding authority, but as confitmationa from u high pourco of the "pinion3 of tha minority of your cpn'i'.v:! At this poiut in the report, tho minority of your co-maiittee havi oretl.' vrith haviug hcard tead ou tUo Qoor ot' j t Siis house the r.'jüirt of t-ieir breihren the uiijorit y, Rud wc canuot, n justioe to ilio subject, refrain even uow froaj uo enig bricily sjüis pointa in that document wliieh wc cunsidi'r most unfairly i ed. It is endcavored by the uiajority to ! evado the fall torce ot' the caso ui' i'riír ! vs. Pémisylvania, byo sweeping assertion ' tjat all' (pee poi-lions of the opinions in ' tliat case wbicli apply to tho nut tor uow in issue were mero obiter dut, or " iülo g.ibblc of tho juJges.'1 Now v.-o nssert, without fear ot' suceesáful contradicti t]at of tbc wbola court wlio sat in that case, ccrtainly seveii JudgO3, possibly n'me - though, ïf Justinos Oairon and MeKinley were present, they gave but a ilentassont- agreed iu the main, C3sentialpoiut, that all mfriendly State legislatiou oa the Sttbjoot of tho restoratiou or recspturo of fugiti7e slaves was unconstitutional -A'.A void. Jiulge Tancy, it i trui, hoids that the Stutus may and s'iould pass lavrá to aid and a5sist in carryi'.ig out the act of Congress, and thtret jre, that the powur of Gongress is not Cï:!us:'ve. But he holds, as do tho vbole court, thut the State can pnss no act to iinpede or hinder the execution of the provisioiis of the Cunstitution or the laws lassed undcr it ; and Lhis may be seen at a gíance by refuning to the opinión of Mr. Justice Wayne, on page 636 of löth volume Peters' lieports, who sums up the viovrs of all his brethren aud coucurs -tshútly witb Judgo Story. So, also, t'.io uiajority ;ittempt to evade tho torce of the caso of Jack es. Martin, 12 Weodell, by sa'ing that ihe law of New York i review iu thut cara provided for a repliiin, and not a habeos corpus. But, were it not for the provisión oí' th coustitutij:) in question, the rtplttin vould be oqually as legal as tho hubsas corpus The opinión of the court in that case, for lio purpose lor whicli we havo before referrcd to, is too cloar a_d decisivo to bc avoided iu that w.iy. Aud then the report lapsos intoa rbapaody over t!ü moderation of the Legislatura of 1855 i:t not enaotiog a more strirgent law, ProBi Sucb moderation may Leaven proteet os. What kind of niodt-ration it was tho Comnnttee ou Sta'e Affairs ofthia House, of 1859, seetu to have been t'ullj' aware. öeo jouriia!, jages 527-8. The oommittee of 1859 thought that the law of 1865, if faitbfully extcated, would prevent the delivering up of fugitive slaves. Now, under the cicitcuio'.it of the time, porhaps it is not Btrange that gentlemen of that committee wlio were uot hnvyers should sanction such &n intout. Uut shall we, ' who know the right, still the wrong pursue V The majority report also takes the ground that the fugitivo slave act of 1850 is uueoastitutioual ia so far a3 it deuies the writ of hnbeas corpus But we ask, if tliis ere so, does the law of 1793 allow the habeas oorjm, or do the principies assumed by any ot' the seven Judges in Prigg vi. Penosylvania, uuder this act, or do the majority oí the coininitteo, now for the first time, decide that act to be unooustitutional, and is not that aot in torce still ' Aud, io this connection, tho majority cite the case of Ablo:nan vs. Booth, 21 Howard, p. 506, as süstaining their positiou, and theu extract from the opinión of the court the foltowing : We do not question the authoriiy of a State eourt or judge, vrho is authorizod by the laws of the títaíe to issue the writ ot' habeas corpus - to issua it iu any case where the party is imprisoned within ita territorial liraits, provided it does uot appear, -when the application is made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under the authority of the United States The court or judge has a right to inquire, in this mode of proccediug, for what causa and by what authority, the prisoner is coufined within the territorial himts of the State sovereisnty. And it s the duty of the Marshal, or any othor persiu having tho custody of the prisoner, to make known to tho judge or court, by a proper rnturn, the authority by whieh he holds him in custody. This right to in quiri by procesa of habías corpus, and tho duty cf offieers to make a return, grows necessarily out of tho complex charactor of ovir governmeut, and tho existence of two diatinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial spaoo, each of them restricted in its powers, and cacli, within it3 sphere of action, prescribed by ths Constitution of the United Stateá, independent of the ether. But, after the return is made, and the State judg-3 or court judicially apprised that the party is in custody under tho authority of tho United States, they eau proceed no farther. They theu know that tho prisoner is within the dominion aBd jurisdiction of another governmünt. We confess we are only writing froin memory of what the report contaius, as we heard it read. But allow us to finish the paragrapb, and the majority may have all they oan make by the citation. The court proceeda in these words: "And that neither the writ of habeas corpus, nor any othcr proees3, issued under State au thority, can pass over the line of d'visionbetween the two sovGreignties Ho is then within the dominion and exclusive juriadiction of the United States. If he haa committed an ofFensa against their lnws, their tribuaals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully iinprisonod, their judicial tribunals can reléase him and afford hirn redrens. And although, as we have said, it is the duty of the Marshal, or other person holding him, to make kuown, by a proper return, the authoritv under which he detains him, it is at the 'saaie time mpeiatively bis duty to obey the procesa oi' the United States, to hold tho prisoner in custpdy uuder it, and to refuse obedience to the maBdate proooss of any other governmeut. And oonsèquently it is bis duty not to lake the prisoner, nor sulfer htm to 'oe taken before a State judge ov court upoa a habeas corpus issued under Stato authority No State judge or court, aftor they aro judicially informad that tha party is impriso:iad under the authority of tho United States, has any right to interioro with him, or to reqoire hiin to be brought baforo them. And if the authority of a State, in the form of judicial process or othcrwiso, shoulil attempt to control tha .Marshal or other authorized oflicsr or aguut of the (jLiittíJ Síates, respect, in th custody of i.is priaoner, it would be his duty to resist it, atid to cali to bis aid any forco that jnight ba neoessary to joaintain the authority of law agiinst illegal jiitcrfareace. No judicial process, whatever foriu it may assume, can havO any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiotion of tho court or judge by whoni it is ssued; anJ an attompt to eñforco it beyond those boundanes is íiothing less thai) lawless violencri" Tbia is thf opinión of tho Suprema Court cí tlie United States on writ of ,rfüX Ui tb& vrell kuown Wucunsin caso. ilüd we the report búfurc us, wc might further be tompted to notico Biueh of its ! Bophirftioal muiiniiig. But we tliiuk most oandid, intclligeut readers vrill bo able to d ) this for themselves: Iu eouulusion, then, the minority of jour conimittee herewith report th bilí lo reueal sectioi:s two, throe and four of a:i ayt entitled '-An act to proteet tho rights and libertios of the inhabitants of thig State," approved Fob. 13, lfc'55, re-.' ferrad to them, and recommend its 1 ege. inda to tbe bilí to anjend tion i") o! chapter i3 ot' the Kevised Statufo cf 18 6, berag seeto:i 5,785 ot' ívs, as '.lUvíudeil by act No. ib'J of the Süssioa L;uvs of iSÖO, we propos? to amend the same uo that tha penalty shall bo applied onlj: to tho,-e who shall, without authority of law, "brbg uy uegrOj mulatto, or othcr persou of color uto tliis State, nainst hra or lier will, and shall eodeavor to hold him or her as a slnvo ia thia State;" thus anicnding the applicatiou of the peuulty to the cuso of a party passing through this Stato with a remanded slave uudcr the act of Coogress, and also the mere nakod claitaing of a slave who has, of his own acoord, aooompaniod his master on a Northcru summcr tour; and berëwitb submit au ainendinout for that purposa, and rccoiuinend the passage of the bill thus ameuded, and aak to be discharged trom thu furtlier consideration of this sabjeot.