No Fruitless Battles

Krnin Ihe N. Y. World. The ery umoug certniu nowspapers is for ba Ules, üuo of the most hut headod lias even dêtniuidcd '■ a battle a d.v." - lt is vcry evident tbat there is gmtig to be i goud deal of disappoiiitniont in the Mipply of tlus sort of sensation. Thore ■v ill nol bc lio battle a day - probably ut onc a mouth of any magnitude - ics.sibly not moro thun two or three during the wbolo period of hostilitioB. 'J'he manilest design ia to tight 110 battles of mi indecisivo character ; and the roa 11 deciike battlus must, of necesstty, be very few in nunibcr. It will retjuhre but a single battk' of this kiud to put us in petBeesion of lliohmond ; and it i.s with reference to that battle, and tbat alune, that the govcrnincnt is direct ing its ïnoveineiits. Werc öentral McDowell to push bis forcea direetly upon Manaesau Junetion. he might, pérbaps, witb bis ncarly equal farces, ilisloilge the eneiny nfter a sharp engagement; but the eneniy would only fall back upon othcr positions, and wonld be ia a ooudition to try the chances of half a dozen battlcs bvtfore ninking a Miial stand at tho enpitil, Wc Sa}', try the chances; for talk as we may of skin and courage, there is no öenying tbat nfter all a great dol in e very batlle dependa upon the accidental and the anforseen. - Wellington bimself, with all his ability, so admitted. I ristend of allowing the rebels any such chances, whieli miglit long postpone the occupation of Iliebinond, the policy actually chosen matirfcstly is to use stratcgy, so that a single defeat of the rebels shall put them Completelv hors du comhot, and oceamen the imiQCuiate surrender of the Virjntfift c-ipital with the entire Stute. Thereforc the Federal columns in eastern and northern Virginia do not advance upon Manasses Junetion until General McClullan, with his división in western Yirp'i'y.a, can move on to the Shei'-r.idoah, wtiere, he may. be ablo tcTtake the enemy upon tl.e flank, and by his ability thus to turn cvery position, ronder it imposible for the rebels to make a stand short of Puchinond itself. To accoihplish tb ia it is necessary for Gen. McClellan to move witb souie degrec of caution, for he is dceper iu the country tbnn the comniaudyrs of the other divisions, and bas no such reserves to protect his rear. His known euergy of eharacter and eminent military taleuts are a sufücient guarantee that hc is niaking tho best of his means and his time. When he once rea?hes his utended base of opera tiong, and the combiued moveinent commeuces, Mauassas Junetion, we venture to predict, will e. Uier be evacuutcd without a conflict, or, if one actually takes place, the encmy will be left in a condition to tn.ike a seo oud impossible. It is this combina;iov' of movcment from different directions UP" on the encmy tbat is to crush h"-'1! an not any succession of single dv8 m '''3 front; and, for such a eoiuï'Qation to bc made cffective, timo Kiawpcnsable. It must never ir a moment be forgottt4. that the paccessful termiuation of a oatnpaign '':e tns '"' '10 "hcart of a liostile country requires quite a different ku of prowess from that siiuply whieh niakea soldicrs undaunted in battle, and irresistible in the breach. It demands not only unfliuching valor, and the highRst degrec of military skill, but the most extraordinary admininistrative ability - a fertility of resource, a power of combination, a precisión of calculation, and a range of view that are seldom possessed by a single mind. It also requires the exercise of all that moral power whieh alnno can, for a prolonged period, conquor numbers by skill, cjnqucr rapiñe by liis-cipliuc, conquer cruelty by humanity, and by its very display of moral heroism shall unnerve physical resistance. It is (eneral Scott's graat glory that in Mexico he proved himself cqual to all theso necessities, and thereby cffected a conquest whieh, for coinpïeteness and absolute exemptiou from reverses of all deBeriptions, 5tan;!s almost isolated in modern warfare. The battles of Mexico have nftcu been surpasscd ; the coquest of Mexico nevcr. Invasión is a kind of military work that even the groatest generala have failed in. Alexander the Great overran Media and l'ersia, but his armies were rolled back before the legious of Scythia aud India. Cyrus inarclied lus anny iu splendid etyle iuto l'ersia, but only to iunnortaliz') the skill whieh conducted tho " rctreat of the ten thousand." Hannibal swept down with irresistible forcé into Italy, only at last to retreat from it in ignominy. Crassus carricd his cohorts into tho plains of Mesopotamia, but only to be defeated with immense ülaughter and to lose his own licad. Napoleon led his hosts iuto tho middle of llussia, and led them to destruction, there, too, the Swcdish invadar, Charles XII., a buudred years before, had found bis doom. liurgoyne marchcd his forces into American territory, and marched to n iurrendcr. Sobieski, with forty thousand, attacked eighty thousand Turkish veterans intrenched and defended with three hundred pieces of caunon, slew fifty thousaud aud carried the Poüsh ensigns in triumph to the bauks of tl Danube ; and yet a month aftnr ther was scarcely a remnant of his anny left. Wellington drovo Maasena at the head of a buudred thousand men out of warwa3ted Portugal, but before his full success in the Peninsula, had to retire and iutrench himself behind the Torre Vedras. The British generáis, in their invasión of Affghanistau, accomplished marches across mouutain ranges and desevt tracks unparalkled in modern times for their length and hardship, but the issue thoreof may be read in the terrible tragedies of the Koord Caubul aud tho Pass of Jugdalluck, and in tho fate of that sixteen thousand of whom but ono man efcaped olive to teil the tale of slatightcr. It doos not answer to talk flippantly of such military movements as General Scott is now uDdertaking. Tromendous difficultics attend them. Nothing is more certain than that overwhelniing disaster would result if the reduction of t:ie vast rebel territory were given up to the rash impulses and ignor.'int counsols of the Tribune and Tinua school. Our ,;i)vorniucnt might as wcll abdtidon the war at once. I5ut thero is uo such danser. These movemeuts areto be conductcd by General Scott, and not by uewsptipcr editora ; and in a way that shall seeure solid results, though uot sensation itchcs. As little as possiblo will be tod to chance. The main work in niiíng out the rebellion will be effected by notseloss stategio operations ; and ■viieu battles are fought they will be bat.:..- thiit need not be ;cpeated. We rei,';rd tbe eonquest of the rtbellion assuro :., ,my future event ; but it i.s because ivo have implicit faith in the geniu that . ads, as well as in the strength that ls led - in the consuiiimate wisdom tbat plans, as well as iu tho beroio courage that executes. L5L" Tho flag ngreed upon for the SUle of Xorth (Jarolin:i, haí a red fieM wi-h ;i single star in tho conter. On the upper ex'rernity ís the inscription, 11 May 20, 1775," and at tte lower, " May 20, 18G1." There are two bars one of blue and the othor of white.