Secret History Of The Peninsular Campaign

The following important officinl oorrcspondenee hetween Gens. McClellan and Halleck, oonoarning the removal of the army f rom the Peninsula, haa justbeen made public. We give it 86 purt oí tl.e history of tho times: Bekkley, Va., Aug 4, 1862-12 M. (In cypher to Mij. Gen. Halleck, Commander-in-Chief :) Your telegrnm of last evening is roeeived. I must confesa that it has oauseii me tho greatest pain I ever ex perienced, fur X am convinced that the order to withdraw the army to Aquia Creek will prove clisastrous in tho extreme to our causo. I l'ear it. will be a fatal blow. Several days are nccessary to complete the arrangement for eo important a movèment as this, and whilo theyaro in progress I beg that careful cousideration may be given to my statement. This army is now is novv in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on bolh banks of the James Eiver, so we are free to act in any direction, and with the assistance of the gunboats I consider our commuDication as now secure. We are now twenty-five miles from Eichruond, and are not likely to meet theenemy in force sufficient to fight a baltle until we havo reached fitteen or ivventy miles nearer, which brings us praotically witliin ten miles of Richmond. Üur longest line of land transportion would bo from this point twenty-five miles, but wilh aid of gunboats we cao supply the army by wator during its ndvunue oertainly to within twülvo miles of Richmond. At Aquia Greek we woujd bo soventy-five miles from Eichtiond, with land transportation all the way. From hero to Fort Monroe is a march of ibout eeventy miles, for I regard itasimpracticabla to withdraw tliis army and its material except by land. The result of the movement would be to march 135 miles to reach a point now only twontyfive miles distant, to deprive ourselves entirely of tho powerful aid of gunboats and other transportation. Add to these the oertain uemoralization of the army, wliich would ensue, the tembly depressing effect opon the people of the North, and the stern probubility that il would influí nee foreign powers to rucognize our adversarles. Thero appears to me sufficient roasons to mttke it my imperativa duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by pur language, that this order may be revoked, and that so far ÍVoin recalliog this army, it be promptly reinforced to enable ít to resume the offen8ve. It may te eaid thero are no reinforcements available. I point to Gen. Burnsicle'g force ; to that of Gen. Pope, not necessury to maintain a strict dtfunse of Washington and Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the army of the Weet not required for a strict defenso there, Here, directly in frorrt oi the army, is tho heart of the rebellion. It is hora that all our resources should be colieoted to strike the blow which shajl determine the late of this nation. All points of secondary mportance elsewhere should bu abandoned, and every availahle man brought here. A decided victory hcre tnd the military strength oí the rebellion voqld be crushed. Jt matters not what partial reverse we may meet with elsewhere, here is the truo defrrtge oí Washington. It is here on the bank of the James Eiver that the fateof the Union should be decided. Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have over been, and still am, actnated solely by love oí my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenoed me from the commeneement of this war, I now do what I never did in my life. I entreat that this order may be rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail I will, with n sad heart, obey your orders to the utmoat of my power, devoting to the movement, une of tho utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess, whateer the result may be ; and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings, I shall at least havu the interna! satistaction that I have written anci spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my powbr to arrest disaster from my country. (Signed) G. B. McCltllas, Maj. Gen. (Official Copy) Headqnarters Armv, Washington, D'. C, Nov. 23, 1862. To this Halleck returned the followng; Wasiiinqton, Aug. 6, 18G2. Majoi' General McClellan, Gommanding, 4c, Berkley.Vft.: Genbbal : Your telegram of yesterday was receivod this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more tully by mail. You, General, certainly, could not have been morepained at receiving my order than I was at the necessit} of itisuing it. I was advised by high officials in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order íitely on my arrival here, but I dotermitiü.d not to do so i:ntil I could learn your wishes l'i'oin a pirsopa) nlerview I tried every means la my power to avoid withdrawing your arrny, nnd deliiyed ijy decisión as long as I darpd to delay it I assure you General it was not a heartless and inconsiderate act#but one that caused mo more anxious thought than arjy other of my life, but aíter iu'l and mature eonsjderation üf all tho pros and cons, I was reluctántly foic-.üd to tho conclusión that the order must be issijed. Allow mo to alinda to a few of the fact oí the ense. You and ynnr officera at our interview estiinated tbe enerny'.s forcé ti and around {Liehmond at 200,000 men; since thon you and others report that they haee received apd are rcceivjng larga reinforcemente from the South. - Qetjeral Pope'8 army now covering Washington is only 40,000. Your elfectiva forcé is only about 90,000. - Yon are only thirty-five mjles tram liichnrond, and General Popa, eighty or ninety, with the enemy direoily betvyeen you, ready to fu 11 with his superior numbers upnn one or tk? other, as he rflay olect. Neither can reinforce t!)e other in casa yf such an attnck. If Pope'i be deslined to reinforce you, Washington, Mai-yland and Ptnnsylv;mja wpufd be Téft oncorwd nú posed. Jf your {urce be reduoed to elrengthen Popo, you would be too wenk to even hold the position you occupy, should the enemy turn around and attack you in full force ; in other werdfl, the "army oí the Potomao is split in two ports", w'nh the entire force of tho enemy directly between them. - They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruotion, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forcos by water to the Peninsnla is unrk-r present eircumstances a military irnpossibility. The only alternativa i to sond the forces on the Península to some point by water- say Frederipksburg where the two armiea can be united. Let me now alludo to sorce of the objec'ions which you have urged. - You say that to -withdraw f rom the present position will cause the certain demoralization oí the army, which is now is now in excellent discipline and condition. I cannot understand why a simple changa of position toa new and.by no means distant base will demoraliza an anny in excellent discipline, unless officf.rs themselves assist in the demoralization, whioh I ara satisfied they will nol. Your change of front from your extretne right, nt Hanover Court House, to your present positron, was over thirty miles. But I havo not heard that it dërnoralizfld your troops, notwithstanding the nevero losses they sustained in effeoting it. A new base on the Bappabannoek, at Fredericksburg, brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures, a reinforoeincnt of 40,000 or 50,000 iresh and disuiplined troops. The change, with such advnntages, will, I thiuk, if properly presented to your army.enoourage ratber than deráoralíze troops. Morover, you yourself sugges ted that a junotion might be effacted at Yorktown, but that a flank march across tha Península would be more hazurdous thaa to retire to Fortress Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is two orthree miles further from Eichmond than Fruderickbburg. Besides, the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack by thetnemy. The politica! "eöeot of the withdrawal may ut irst ba unfavorable, büt I think the public aie beginning to understand its neeewity, and that they will havo more confidetico in a united army than the separate fragmenta. But you will reply, why not reinforce here, so that í can strike Richmond from my position ? To do this, you said at our interview, that yon required 50.000 additional troops. I told you it was irnpossible to give you so rnany. You finally thought you would have some chance of success with 20,000, but you afterwards telegraphed that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely reinforced. - If your estímate of tfie enemy's strength was corrent, your requisitioo was porfectly reasonable ; but it was utterly impossiblo to fill it ' until new troops oould bo enlisted and organized, which would require eeveral eeks. To keep your army in its present position until it couíd ba reinforced, would almost destroy it. In that climate, the months of August and Sep tember are almost fatal to whites on that part of the James Iiiver, and even after you got the reinforeements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries bef ora you coujd advaqoo on Eicbmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of the fortifications would not require as much time as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the meaniime tten. Pope's foices would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you. In regard to tho demoralizing effect of a withdrawal Irom the Península to the Rappahannock, I must remark, that a large number of your highest oflicers, indeed, a mnjority of those whose opinions have boen reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the move ment. J3ven several of those who originally advocated lbo line of the Península, now advine its abandonment. I have not inquired, and do not de6ire to know, by whose advice or for what reasons the army of tho Potomac was separated into two parta, with the enemy between them. I must tako things as I find ihem. I find the frces divided, and I wish to unite them. The only feasíble plan lias been presented for doing this. If you or any one elsehad presented a better one, I should certainly bave adoptedit; but all of your plans require reinforeements, which it is im possible to give you. It is veiy easy to ask for reinforeements, but it is not so easy to give tbein when you have no disposition of' troops at your command. I have written very plainly, as I nnderstand the casa, and I hope you will give ma tha credit for ha ving considered the nnitter, although I may have arrived at different conclusiüna from your own. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,