The Campaigns Of 1863

F rom the Chicago Times. Evory thing indicates tbat the campaign of 1863 has reached its end, and ,hat, for the next four or five months, ao;ive operations will not ba resumed upon a scale of any great magnitude. Meado :iaa desisted früin tho pursuit of Lee and Fallen back to the hither bank of the Friendly Rappahannock ; Grant, owing to the neeessity of accumulating supplies, and tho execrable eharaoter of the inountain roads over which bis advance must necessarily be made, will not be likely to leave Chattauooga.at present. Longstreet, by the defeat oí liragg, had been compelled to raiso the siego of Knoxville aud abondon the project of recapturing East ïeunessee ; by which quiet prevails at all the prominent points along the line of Federal operatious. On the first day of January of the present year the Federal army, under Gen. Eoseerans, was burying its dead which liad fallen the day previous in the treineuduous battle of Murfrecsboro, or as generally termed Stone River. That saine uight Biagg, under cover of darkness, withdrew bis dishearttd forces, aud took up a new line of oecupation upon the south side of Duek River. ïhus, at the opening of 1863, the rebels held, west of the Mississippi, all the country south of the Arkansas river, at on the eust of the Father of Waters, nearj ly or all, south of a line which comniencedj on the river at Vicksburg, ran up the Yazoo river to Yazoo City, then rau off! irregularly to the uortheast till it reach- ed Bragg in Tennessee on Duck river. - From this point it continued eastward, includiug East Teunessee, uutil ït reach ed its terminus in the Kast somewhere not far from Fredericksburg, on the Potomac River. The States held by the rebels were about ouo half of Arkansas, nearly all of Louisiana, Tesas, and Mississippi, all of Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South and North Carolina, with trifliag exceptions, and the west part of Teunessee and Virginia. Tho Federal forces held two hostile southern States, Missouri and Kentucky ; held half of Arkausas, half of Tennessee, one-third of Virginia, and had cfl'eeted lodgmeuts on the coasts of all the others. How niucb. have wo gainod during the present year ? Nothiug in Virginia ; the rcmaiuiug half of Tennessee ; of Mississippi about oue third, or, practioally, the country lying west of the railroad that runs from Memphis to Mobile ; and the navigatiun of tho Mississippi. In Arkansas, tho chief differenee between the bcginning and end of the year is, that that then the rebels occupied the Arkansas lliver, which is now oeeupied by us. From this it will be seen that that the gain in territory on the part of the Federal Government is very smaü. Strategically, we have made greater progress Ihan in territory. At the winning of the year the rebels held Vioka jurg and Port Hudson, through whicli icy were able to avail themselves of tho' norraous produotions of Texas and westrn Louisiana. At Duck river they ;uarded Chattanooga, the door which pened into the very heart of the Con ederacy, and also secured to themselves ie posession of East Tennessee, the graary of the Confederacy. From Tozat ney obtained immense supplies of cattle, nd from East Tennessee, hogs, grain, nd aaltpetre without limit. In capturing Vicksburg and Port rludson, we cut them off from the live tock of Texas, and in getting East Tennssee, we deprived them of an inexhausti Ac source of cercáis aud a vital constitBut íd the manufacture of gunpowder. In hese two positions they bave sustained n irreparable loss. The plenty which eigned in the South during the yeara receding has departed, and in its place omes the grim monarch Famine. In othcr respects we have icflicted light damage upon the Confederaey. ?he siege of Charleston has, as yet, dono nothing more than close that port against vessels running the blockade. At Wilnington, we have, by a large and experisive addition to aur squadron, succeeded n stopping much of tbe coutrahand trada whilo the same is the case at Brownville, in Texas. Tho victories at Vicksburg and Chattanooga, especially the latter, give ui other advantages, which, however, are rather prospective than present. Thö next rebel line of defencej owing to tha situation of stroama and railroads in tho South, must be formed with its left OU Mobile, its right covering ana íts centro trontingUranc at Atlanta.It is only by thus reforming their line ;hat they will be uble to preserve coi-' munication between the wiDgs- -a eondition absolutely essential to the strengtb and intesrity of this cordoa of defence. Small bodies may for a wbüo disputa the possessioa of suoh points as Jaekson,Mondan and Dalton, while it is certaiu that guerrillas will infest the whole country north cf the new rebel lino; but alt such operations are irregular and valtíelcss beyoad the temporary annoyance' they may cause an advancing enemy, a they do not at all effect the vital issues which must be met and settled at Mobila Atlanta and Riehmond. This new liue upon which the rebel armies are thus furced is their last, and by far the most indefensibie one which they have at any time oecupied. lts air line length is much shorter than any of the others, but ïta actual length, owing to the tortuosity of the railroads which coanect t, so much rreater. The conditioff of preserving their communication from wing to wing will be greatly enhanoed ia difficulty, from the fact that the Confederacy laeks for rolling stock and means of repairing its railroads. The result will be that communication at firat will be exceedingly slow and difficult, and, ir a little while, from the complete wearing out of cars and tracks, impossible. But while the rebels will lose many conditions of great value, in beingforcedupon their sole remaining line of tbey will gain one immense advantage. Every foot tliat they yield enables them1 to concéntrate upon th'e shorter inner line of defence, wh;lc it corrcspondingly weakens us by lengtlienicg our cornmunication as wo advance. Our arraies are now so far from tbeir bases of supply that a very süglit interruption would be fatal; it is necessary to guard absolutely against any such contingenoy by leaving a small anny at every point as we leavc it. Tlyr weakcus enortnously our capacitius for offeuce, and is one of the main reasous why the iíorth is obliged to cali for men incessantly, iu order to preserve its. advances and at the same time rendar its" movements effectivo. The battles of the present year have, in magnitude, exeeeded [bmM previous campaign. jÊ stand out iu boldM contests are : FiB lorvüle, Gettv amauga, and JH to these, we S affaii's,jA name ■ by oofl Amcfl EvSB one-tlB althoiM not d'Ê wordfl Anijfl in aH stracfl cd toV P[ tban cS Bpr In ncTuSM the cnWIiioro tban ehecked- -irflP cases lic drew off bis army without de ïnoralization, and retircd at his leisure,' and in good order, and unmolested. Chickamauga was a grcater contost thaa Chattanooga, but was not deeisive; it effected no important reSults, and left the respective arniies not materially different from what they wero bofore the engagement. Champion Tlilla was deelsive, for it decided the fate of Vicksburg, and gave us material advantages in the cutting off of ïexas from the Oonfederaoy. Chattanooga was also deeisive, for it gave us East ïennessee, and bas thrown the rebels back upon their last liuo of deienec ..