Conclusion Of Gen. Mcclellan's Report

Geu. McClbllan concludes bis able report of bis campaigns with the followi ing general rcmarks worthy a careful reading : It would be iniposjjible to particípate in opeiations S'ich as tbose deseribed in the t'orego'uig pgos, without forming fix ed opinions upou subjecls councctcd wilh tlie orgunizutinn of our armies, and tlie general couduet of military opera tierna. This report would be incomplete with out a brief allusion to some general considera! ious which have been firmly iinpressed upou me by the eveuts whieh have oceurred To ïuy mind, the roost glaring defect in our armies is the absence ot' systeru in the appointment and promotion of general iud other offiuers, and the want ot QiéuDfl lor the theoretical iris ruclioD of the masa of offieers. The expansión of the ariny was so great and so rapid at the coinuiencement of the existing wur thaj, it was, perhaps, impossible, in the great scureity of inslrucied offieers, to have adopted a:;y other course thati that Wbiuh was pursued, but the time luis ar rived wben measures uiay be initiated to remedy existiiig defects, aud to provide agüiiiiit their recurreiice. I thiuk tiiu amiy übaula be regarded as a perinaneut one ; that is to say, its allang should be aúini steped preciscly as 11 all wh'i belonged to it ha inade it their profession tor life, and thoqa. ruleq for promotion, etc, which have been foniid uecesary in the best foreigt] aruiies to exciie emulation, produce an esprit de corps, and procuro efficieuóv, 8hould be foüowed by uh. All offieers and soldiers sbould be made to leel that merit - that is to suy, courage, good conduet, the knowledge and peí formalice of the duties of iheir grades, and fitness to exercise those of a superior grade - will inwure to theui advaiicement in their prnfession, and can alone secure it for thein. Measures should be adopted to secure the theoretical instruction of ttatl offi cevs, at least, who should, as far as pos sibie be seleeted trom ofiicers liaving n military eduration, or wbo have seeu actual service in the field The Diiiuber of cadets at the military apadeuiy sbould be at once inereased to ilie greatest capacity of the institution. The regular arniy shuuld be incmised, aud (iiauitained complete iu uumbers und ejfipitiiicy A well organized sysiem of recruiting, and of depoty fur instruc-tion, should be adopted, in order to keep the rauks of the regimeiits fu 11, and sijpply proinptly tfje losse- arismg from batile or disease This is espepialjy neeetsarv for the artillery aud cayalry urtns of the service, wbicji, ffoni the bpgmping of thewar, have rendered gïeat services, and vvhicli ba1 e never been fully appreciated by any but their eoiurade. We need, aiso, ) a rge bodies ol well-instrucfod epgineer troups lu the arrangement and conduct of campaigus, the üirectiou slmuld bo left tp professional oldit'is. A staicgiiijiu mav, perhaps, be more conipe'eiit tban a soldier to determine the political objects aiid directiou of a caiiipaigu j but ihese oiipe dupffitü LipiJ, evcrytliing sbould ba lelt to the ïtpousible mjjifaiy litad, without juterference frow pivilians. In no otlier mauner 3 sucpegs probable. - The meddling of individual meinbiTS of couiinittees ot' Congress with subjeets which, from lack of' experience, they are of course incapable of coiupreheiiding, and whieh ihey are foo apt to vjv throug}) fhe dibtoited medium of pnrtisau or pert-onal prejudiee, can do 110 good and is etirlain to proauce incalculable uiitfchiet. 1 eau not oinit the expiefsion of wy tjiauks to the President, lor the constant cidt-iice gi ven mu ot' his sincere personal regard, and his desire to siijtaiü fie in.liiury plans which niy jiidgment led me to urge for adoptiuu and execution. I caiuiot attnbute his lailure to adopt sonie of these pluns, and to give that support to otbertj yliioh was necessary to their succesa, to auy want'of eonüdenCL' in me ; and it only remains for me to regret ihat othei' counsels came butween the coustitutioual Conimander in-Chief and the General whom hu had plaped at the bead. pf fis annies - counsels which lesulted iu the faüure of great caiu paigns. , if th,e paljfiR pogsfigses no Generala in service competent to direct its military atiairs, without the aid or supervisión ot' politicianti, the s,Qo,ur it tinds tlieiu and places them iu pogitiou, tfie betfpr l wiH be for its fortunes. 1 may be pardoaed for calling alten tiou to ihe ïnemoraudum submilted by me to thö PregiiJeut 011 the 4h of Au '■ gust lfeOl ; my letter lo hun, of July 7, 1802, and olher similar coujmunicaton to biin and the Secretary of War. I have sceii 110 reason lo cliange, in ;n,y material regard, the views theu epressed. Af er a calm, inipartial and patiënt contsideration of the subject, a Kubjict. wbich demauds the elosest thought on the part of every tru lover of' his couutry, 1 am eouvincud ;hat by the proper ! einployment of the resources, it. is entirely possible to bring this war to a succl'üoi'ul military issue. I beiieve that a necessary preliminary to the re-establishment of the Union, is the eutire dfeat, or virlual destruction of thu organized military power of the Confedérales, and that such a result siiould be accoijipanied and fpllpsved by couuihatory measures and that by pursumg tbe politipal ppurse I havo always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent resforation of ihe Union, a re-uuiou by wjiich the rights of 1 both sectious shall bu preaervvd, and by j which both parties shall preserve their respect wbile tüej rtbcct eacü qüi1 er. Ia tliis report I have confined myself to a plain narrative of auch faota as are necessiiry for the purpose? of history. WIk'ii it was possible I have preferred to give these faots u the lacguige of dispatclies writtco at the titas of their oceurrence, rather thau attempt a Dew rela tí on.