The Raid Toward Richmond

The failure of Gen. Kilpatrick's recent efï'ort to sack llichmond and release tho Uniou prisnners at that poini, sliould p.ut n stop to suph profitless cxpeditions in ihe future. The moral efifeet is bad, as expectations ara raised throughout the country which there is very little chance of roalizing, while the risks run are very largo. It is a marvel, for instauoe, that Gen. Kilpatrick's whole force of five thousaud two bundred men wero uot scattered or eaptured. As it { was, from a thousaud to fifteen hundred horst-8 have been rendered uaeluss, and One hundred and fi ft y good Union soldiera are added to tho over crowded prisons of liichmond. We warned our readers, wh'en first auuouuciug that the raid was under waj7, that thore was not one chanco in fifty of Us suceess; and it has since transpired that this was also the opinión of hoth Generáis Halleck and Meade. Gen. Kilpatr ck, however, who is an enthusiaatic and hopeful officcr, supposed the thing could be done, and the President, with his usual want oi' diseretion, told him to go ahead. - bren, üutler, t seetns, diu not co opérate with tlie expeditiou as he should have done. Ali the corresponderás agree that bad Gen. Kilputrick boon sure uf cooperation by way of the James River, lie would at least havo made a fight for the city. But Butler was not on hand, and Kilpatrick was compel'ed to retiro wheu wiihin sight of the city spires. wIt would be woll fcr the adininistation to realizo now that Richmond can never be taken except by a largo army and an abundauce of' arlillery. It is, and we believo always bas been, impregnable to any raid that could be organizod aguinst it. Richmoua is the rebel capita!, and, assucli! the seat of its military power. - There is a constant movement of troops to and from the city in every direetion, and a day is taifficient to briog a very largo avmy witbin its walls. The fact that the bulk of the Union prisoners are kopt and fod at Richmond, of itself necessitates a very largo guard of rebel troops in that city. This circumstanee also shows how foolish the rumor which have been put forth from time to time, that tfae rebels are about abanrloning Richmond ;is their capital. As a matter of coursc, they send their prisoners to whatever point it wil] cost least 10 fecd them. Probably Atlanta, as ;i great railway center, would serve the purpo-o of the rebol government in this respect as wol!; but t is an iucouveuient place at which to keep a lartre It is evicjoiit that if there were any. diffiïulty i'i su; plying iheir soldicrs with food at Richmond, tho tronble would uot be adiled to by bringing tho prisoners also to that place. Gon. McClellan, in bis grand plan of the campaign agaiust tho rebolri, reeognized Richmond as being the most important point, and oonoentrated lus Lirgest armj to capture it. Subsequent evonts have proved that, after all, il is the most vital strategetic position in the Confederaey, and greater moral and p'iysical re?ults would follow its capture thau any other point now in the possession of the rebel power. But ït must bo done by a largo and wellequipped army, and, moreover, as Gen. McOlellan pointed out, frora the direction of the peuinsala. We hope we have board llie last of tliese wasteful, objeotles8 ind dangcrous raids upoii tho rebel capita!. T!ie destruetion of the roadsin the rebel rear is worih little or nothiog, except io eonaeetioo with au attack of Gen. Meade's arny in front.