The Potomac Army

The Army and Nav'y Journal, in speukjiug of the past and anticipated operations ot the Army of tht Polomaê, describes the peeuliiir difficulties i1 has to eontend with : " Two amies of equal numberit uid commanded with equál ability, heing opposed to eaoh Othar, their tnovements Mlirl aebievemeiits must be entirely do■enninud by the nature of the theut.ru of operations Perhaps never iu the history of warfuro has tho oharaeler of iho ground exerted more induenee on mmpaigns than thal nf the porlioh of Virginia wbïch lies between Washington iind Richmoud. On the; rightof uur army are chaina of niouDtains which euable the rebels to oonoeal any rianking movement they may undertake, while tho valleys afford to them tho means for au easy and uninterrupted passage to the Potomac above Washington, und one almost entirely secure Trom attaoks in the rear. Ón our front is a suecession of rivers, presenting great natura' obstacles to our advanoe, and at the same time easily defonsible. To mako (lanking movernents by aseending them is to open our rear to attacks from Fredericksburg, and to cross below the rebel aïiny, leaves the raihoad a prey to guerrillas. The country #, moreover, inasked in every direcüon by dense torests, rendering ar.ything like a surprise iu forcé impracticable. A few rebel acouts may at all times easily deteut anti thwart such a movement. Suoh are tlie natural features ol the country. It is a well kr.own rule of military opeilition that a " base" sbould neith er be loo extended nor too limited, and tliut it ahould bo accesible by severa] routes. The base of the Army of the Putomae is just the vvidlh of h railroad track, and that r.iilroad furnishes really the only practicable route ol coinmunicatioñ. With a limited base an army is always exposed to be cut iu.the rear. This iö what happens to the Army of tho Fotomap at every advance. Guerrilla bnnds ïnfeat tho whole country between the Uappahannoek and Alesiindria (dome sixty miles), ar.d it is niposeible to protect entirely, in u. hostile country, such an exteut of territory. - For every mile of udvance boyond Fairfax Court House, üve hui)lred meu are required to protect the rear. An entire corps is now occupied iu doing this from the Rappahannock to Martassas, and the troops ot the Department ot Washington protect the traek from that locality to Alexandria. How great is the drain of an army for süch a service can be eaily estimated. Af ter passing the Rapidau, if railroud eommunicatiou is to bo relied ou for supplios, a stroug foree mu.st be ooustantly kept ia the rear; every train wil! even then be exposed to capture by bands sweepiug down from the mounlains. The leaders of the rebels of eóurVé, fully understaud all tbesu ciicumstances, and are alwiiy rewdy to take ad vantage of them. They ara ful 'y iwaro that they can hold iu check, wiill Ihree fiftlis of itsiorco, the Army of the Potomac meantime. They pur.-ue ihe Fabián policy - ihe poliej of Wa?-hing ton on the mountains ot the Hudson River. They are not fooli enough to stake everytliing on the risk of i battle, except where invulnerably fort.ñc-il. - They will not attaok, nor will they ac cept a batllo in the tield. Their osvn rear nceds no prolection; (hoy h:e two ruilro..d roules, be.-.ides atl llie or dinary roaus. T'nup they havo all thu advantage of position on their side Eut are a in view of th.jst diffioulties to ex'pect nothing of the Ai my ot the Potomuc ? No, it may overeóme them in two or three ways. First, with a sufficient force to cover its flanks, it may compel the enemy to retreat and Richmond to be abandonad. Second, it may be able to briug on an engage ment which wül prove decisive. Third, by cutting it looo lrom Wasiiingion and making it a movable column, it may go at auy tiaie to the iear ol the rebel army and open 11 new b.ise tor itself Olí tlio Paniiinkuy or Yo'r'k liiw-is, or by the lailroad l'roni Fii-dviicksburg. We risk iiot'iug tn f'uyiijg that the a'rtny i-an at any time go to Jïirh mond, ií reheved tro n the necessity oí' protecting its renr. This could Iv-Ae been done lat tu.ll, "hen Gen. Muiule crossed the Rupidau and was Üopni d by the rebel wVrks on Mine Run Tho army can transport tifteen days subbisténce and iortigff, and with this it can bo ni'iyjtlii to .Innover C"Ui t lloi:u-, whereitcan iSpeA.t) on u new base; or, if Hiicouisful in fofointr the reb. 1 Unes, can even enter Uk-h mond ;,t ouce."