The Liquor Tax

The following is the text of the deciBion on Ulo liquor tax ]aw given by the Supreme Oonrt at Lan: inji", reeently : Farreu Yomigbloud et al., va. Jaral A, Stxtpn, SlUrifi'. opinión liy Cooley, .T.: Ihè li]l in this cause was filed to restrain the collcriion from the sevcral eomplainants of a tax asKcssccl against them separately in respect to the business in which each is engaged. It in ■ personal tax purely. It was deoidctl at an early day in this State that oquity had no jnrisdiction to restrain tile collection of a personal tax, even couceding it to bc illegal, tbc ordinary legal remedies boing ampie for the party's protection, Williams va. Detroit, 2d Midi., 680. The princiiilf has ever Binde been regarded as not open to controversy in this State, and it va? applied without its soundness beiug contested in Henry vs. Oregory, 29th Mich., 68, decided last year. The question tlieu presents itHelf, how this bill came to bo Bied, and on what ground the Superior Court was asked to, and did, procced to render a decisión on the nierits. The jurisdietional qnestion has not been argucd in this court, but we are uot inclined to pass it over in BÜence, thereby giving countenauec to the idea that by the mere aequiescencc of parties a jnrisdloUon may bc made for a court of chancery, by means of which the extraordinary remedy by iujunction can be made use of to restrain public offlcerB in their action where neither the lcgislation of the State nor the general principies which control the action of courts have over given this remedy. The writ of injunctiou is i harly Hable toubuse; and the practico of resorting to itin cases where it is not allowed by law, rclyiug i upon the opposite party to ovcrlook or waive the j illegality, is not one that can safely bc eucouragod or sanctioned. The .iurisdiction of the courts is never subject to be enlargcd or diminit,]ul at the discretion of cartics, and it would be peculiarly uiinchlevoue to permit jurisdictiou to rest ipon consent or waiver in cases where general public intereste are to be offected by the litigatioi:. The grounds suggested, bilt not argued, as giving equitable Jnrisdiction in the case are, first, that thereby a mnltiplicity of suits may be avoided; second, that othel-wise the proceedings may ripen into a cloud upon the title to complaiuants' lands; i and third, that irreparable injury is threatened to complainants in their business. As the tax is only personal, and as yet affeets no real estáte, and may j never do so, the second grcjiind calis for no j eralion Tho force of the third must rest in the fact that enforcing the tax may in some cases coinpol the suspension of business because it is more than the persou taxed can afford to pay. But if tliis consideraron is sulncieut to j ustily the transfer of a controversy from a court of law to a court of equity. then every controversy where money is dcmanded may be made the subject of equitablo cognizance. To enforce agaiust a dtal;r a prjmisiory note may in some cases at cffectually break up his business as to collect from hmi a tax of equal iimuuut. T'his is not what is kuown to the law s irreparable injury. The courts nave never rsccwnized the consequenccs of the lucre enforcement oí a mouey deiuand as falliug within the category. It ís trae, the Federal eourts have treated the uulawful taxation of a franchise as a case oí irreparable, injury. Osborn vb. U. S. Bank, 9 Wbeat, 738. But this was on the ground that the tax, if enforeed, uiight destroy the franchise, and, in effect, the Corporation itself, the artiiicial person which waa taxed, and the case has little analogy to that of the taxation of a particular business carried on by individuals. If coinplainants rely upou tho jurisdiction of equity to tafee cognizance of a controversy when thereby a multiplicity of suits may be prevented, the reliance f ails becauso the principies that govern that jurisdiction have no application to this case. It is sometimos admissible when many parties are alike affected or threatened by ono illegal act, that they shall unite in a suit to restraiu it ; and this has been done in this Stato in the ome of an Ilegal Í sessnient of lands. Scoville V. Lansiug, 17 Mich., 437 But the cases are very few and very peculiar wliere this can be permitted unless each of the complainants has an cquitable action on his own behalf . Now the nature of this case is such that each of these complainants, if the tax is invalid, has a remedy at law which is as complete and ampie as the law gives in other cases. Ho may resist the sheriff's process as he might any other trespass, or he may pay the moacy nndcr i 'r itert, an-i at ore ) Mie f or and i ecover it back. But no other compinant has any joint interest witli hini in resisting this tax. The sum demanded of each is distinct and separate, and it does not concern one of tho complainants whether another pays or not. All the joint interest the parties have is a joint interest in the question of law- just such an interest as might exist in any case where separate demands are made of severul pesons. Such a common interest there might be if several persons should give several promiBSory notes on dietinct ! purchases of a worthless artiele. ; and such there migüt have been under the former prohibitory liquor law, had demands been made against several persons f or liquors illegally sold to theni. We venture to eay that itwould not De Beriously suggei-ted that a coinmon interest in aDy such questiou , of luw, whcre the legal interests of the ( parties were wholly ilistinct, could constitute , any ground of equitablo jurisdiction wheu , the several controversies affeeied by the queëtiou were purely legal controversies. Suits do not come of equitable coguizance because of their . ber merely This was afflrmed in Lapeer County vb. Hart Har. oh., 157, and iu the two cases of Sheldon vs School District, 25 Conn., 224, and Dodd vs. School District, ibid, 232, which in their facts, so , far as this question is concerned, were like the present case, with a single exeeptiou, which is not to the advantage of these complainants. In those cases the single assessment of a school tax was involved. and the partios concerned, if pernntted to unite niight have had tho whole controversy determined in the one snit. In this case the controversy is either separate, as the tax is eeveral against eaeh individual, or it is general, as it affects all the persons taxed undr the law. Considered as a controversy which affects all pereons taxed, this suit would wholly fail in tho purpose of preventing a ruultiplicity of suits, because the Court in which it was brought has only a local and limited jurisdictiou. Olhcr suits niight be brou"ht outside of Detroit in every county of the State; and at best this suit would only reduce the r of suits, while it could not prevent a ïuultiplicity of them. On this general principie we content ourselves with referring further to Jones va. Garcia 1 Turn & Buss, 2'J7 ; Yeaton vs. Lenox, 8 let., 123 ; Adams' Eq., 108-202. Other considerations on this branch of the case we abstain from presenting, because au argument has been withhcld ; and under such circumstances we deern it advisable to present none but those which are not only conclusive, bnt are unquestionable We present these for the purpose of showing that if the merits ot this controverny were with the complainants the bül would nevertheless be dis' missed becauee tho parties have no standing m a court of equity. They eannot niako remedies for tüemBelves which the law has not given them. e do not know whether thcre was any express assent on the part of the ctofendant to this jurisdiction ; if there was, it could be of no avail, for rcasons alreadv stated. He would be powcrlesB in any case. Bnt spccially so in a case like the present where he ( is acting in a public capacity, and the consent lf j given would not be on his own behalf, but on behalf of tüe public whoni for any such purpose he , han no authority to represent. j The queutiou thcn anses whether, the case being one of which the court below had no iurisdiction, thia court on appeal shall ; ceed to express an opinión upon the merita. The considcrations which bcar upon that question are conflicting. As a general rulo au opinión on the merita of a controversy ought to be declined when the Court is powerless to give the relief demanded. But this case is in many particulars exceptional. It has been argued on tbe merite. The ötatc iutcrviiuiiiR for the pnrpose, and tuero is no reason for any suggestion or suspu-ion that in this Court, at least, it is not a bona-nde controver3y The legal points involved in the rnerits have been presented in good faith, and we have no reason to suppose that, Bhould the controversy be presented again in a moro regular foriu, the caee WOUW asswuie any different phase in the argument. Thcre is beside abundant reáson ipparcnt on ths record for believing that the public interest demands an early deterniiuation of the ciuestion involved. The pendeucy of this suit has to some cxtent delayód for a considerable period the enforcrment of a State law. which is sujiposed tobe oí nlgn importance ; and if this should go off on tho juris(lutiimal question, there is reanon to look for further litigation which would conetitnte a groiind, or at least a preteuse, for fuittior dclay. Under all the oircumstances we are agrecd that an exammatl .n of the case on the merits, and an opinión thereon, are not only justitiablc but are demamled by considerations of 'public importance. The questiou which lies at the foundation of the litigatiou relates to the validity of the act or the tasation of the liquor traftic. passed May J, 1815. General ...aws of 1875, p. 274. The complainants, it aupcars, have severally been asseased a tax as dealers in limo, and they contest the payment on the ground that the Legislature had no cons' itutional authority to iinpose it. A nuniber of reasous are assfgned for tho invalidity of tho tax, and these we shall eonslder separately. 1. It in nbiected thilt the tax is a State speciflo tax, aud that the law inipoaing it ifi unoonsntntlonsj becauee it devotes the uioney raised to the nje oi the towua. viHageawd eltiea iu which the. Imumess taxed is carried ou, iu violation of ArUcle 1, HccUon 14 of the Constitution, which provule that " all speciflc taxes, except thono reccived f rom the Oltnjng eompaniea oi the Upper Península, shall be applicd in payinfi tho interest upou UU Prinurv Hchool, Univeraity, aml other i clu.-ational "fiind, and the interest ond principal oí the State dubt, in the order hirein recited, until the exttnguiabment of the state delit, other thau tho aniounts dne the edncational fuud, when bucu specitio tasas hall be added to, aud eonstituto a part of, the priruary school iutercet fuud." The onl iiuestion that ariSe upou this ob.iection i whether this tax is a State tax or uot. It wan tettlod in Peoplfl v. Wolcott, 17 Mieh., 68, tbat the State mlgb pass Uva for the levy of new specitic taxes, and n Kitson vs. Ann Arnor, 26 Mich., 325. that local e ciiic taxes niight b: authorized. The prlnolpaj dll f irence botween this case aud the one last cited con sists in the fact that these the tax wan leviid unde ,i .lyordinance, and herc it i li-vied by enera Imv. In both caaes the money wan to be put to loca purpoaes. In one senne, undenbtedly, :my tax leviect byai;eneral law iB u state tax ; but if me money are to be put to local usen, the onlv substntiaj ilif u e betwees that and one levi.'d by local ctlo consiste in thia- that in one case tho State levies the tax, and in the other it autborizes the lovy. All taxation rnust be anthorized by tho State ; and we know of no reaKOn why all taxation for the ordinary purpoua of government niay not be levied under general laws when DO exprees provisión of the Coustitution forbida it. Sm'h legislation i no uovclty in this state ör eteewBaïB. Hlutty nnd ncllool taxes are vory coininonly levied in tliat wfly, the lojal authorities, as to nome of thein, havmg no option, bnt being put under legal compulsión to Assem and collect them. The school mili tax may be taken as on ilhiBtration. Oollected under a general law, it was neverthclcss put to the uses of tho community whloh pald it; and it was in no proper tense anything more than a local tax. Neither ia the tax now in quetition. 2. Itissaid the tax in invalid because it is not levied on any principie of equality or uniformity, and consequently lacks one of the essential clementB of lawful taxation. If the precise point here is thal the tax is uuequal and unjnut bccause it is not levied in proportion to the business done, then üie oljection is without force. It may possibly be truc that au apportionment according to the businewt done wouid have been more just; but a question of thia nature concerr s the Legislatura and not us. Cowrts caunot annu ' tax laws because of their operating unoqually ajd unjnstly; if they could they uiight defeat all taxation whatsoever ; for there never vet was a tax law tlittt was aot more or lesa unequal and nn.iust in its practical workings. Kirby vs. Shaw, 39 Penn. St. 258 J Commonwealth vs. Savings Bank, 5. Allen, 423; Allen vs. Drew, 4-1 Vt., 174; Orim vb. School District 57 Penn. St., 433; I'eople vs. Worthington, 21 111 , 171 ; Coburn vs. RichardBon, Míikh., 213, 21B; Coito vs. Sartngs Bank, 32 Conn., 173, 184. But the ob.icction to a want of uniformity is wholly misplaced here. Uniformity is tho vcry basis of this tax : It is levied entirely without discrimination ; and the real objection made to it iü, not that it lacks uniformity, but that the Legislature were unjust inmaking it uniform instead of levying it by sotne standard of diBcrimination. The objection presents a case of miKapphcation of terms. It is also presented to the wrong tribunal, The question whether a tax is jnBt and equal or not is not a question of law. And this will j moet any objection to the law based upon the fact that other kinds of business are not similarly taxed. Apportionment of taxation is pnrely a legislative unction. 3. It is urged that the tax ia void as a local tax because the municipalitics have no voice in its levy and collection. In support of this objection deciaions are cited in which this Court affirmed the right of the municipalities to choose thejr own local officers. and to decide for theniselvcs whether they would burden thcir property with taxes for mere local conveniences in which the peoplc of the State at large had no interest. Those decisions were made in cases in which the municipality was objecting to unusual legislation which proposed to I subject it to extraordinary burdens. 'Ihere is : noti-iug of the Hke nature hcre. The municipality is not complaining, and the legislation proposes to make its burdene lighter instead of heavier. The comp!aint, if any local rights ure invaded, comes f rom the wrong source. The city ought to be here showing cause why she should be compelled to receive the tax inBtead of these cranplainants showing cause why they should not pay it over to the city. When the city of Detroit Bhall obiect to nave the money thrust upon her, it will be time enough to inquire wLethcr any ol ner privileges are taken away by the law; at present it is Btilllricnt to eay that partieB whose interests are directly antagonistic to those of the city in regard to tho particular matter in controversy, are not to bc hl ard objectinsr on her behalf that the rights of a city are violated by the collectio of a tax for her use. But it canuot escape even the most casual observation that the purpose of tuis legislation, so far as it involves local rights, is directly the oppoeite to that which was held inadmissible in People vs. Hiirlbut. 24 Mich.. , and Park Comniissioners vs. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich., 228. The U'gislation which canie under consideración in thofie cases was desigued to eventuate in taxation of the people of Detroit agiinst their oppoeition. This only provides for a general tax, whicn, so far au it is collected wilhin any particular locality, is handed over to the local auüiorities and creditcd to the local contingent fuud. As a part of that f und it will be put to such purposes as the local authoritics may agree upon, and presumptively these will be the general purposes ot local government. The law, therefore, favors the localitics instead of forcing unusnal burdenb pon tbom. 4 It is objected that the Sheriff is made ttte collector of townsuip, village and city taxes under this law, wheu by rigllt that duty and the fees given for its performance belong to the Township, Village or City Collector, or Treasurer. This objection, like the last, comes from the wrong source. Those on whose behalf it is made are not here as parties, and we are not awaro that they complain. The parties taxed are the persons who manifest this decided interest in the constitutional emoluments of the office of Collector, and not those who are said to be entitled to the f ees. If the objeution were a valid one it i aot olear that it could invalídate the tax ; it might only raise the quesuon 01 uie ngm ui a jmiticular ofliccr to collect it. It is certain that it could conetttute no objection to the tax in cquity ; for as between the town or city anti the party taxed the ecjuity of the Ik is uot in the least ffected by the circuinstances that the wrong oflicer is deputed to collect it if that constitutes the only valid objection, but we think the objection is without force eitluratlawor in equity. Admitting what these complainants insist upon, that the TownRhip and City Ooilectors have a constitutional right to perform all the duties that belong to their offices when the Constitution was adopted, it does not f ollow that they are entitled to collect this tax. A constitutional riirht to perform the old duties cannot be extended ti' cover new duties merely because they happen to be oí' a similar nature. ThiB law takcs froni the local ofiicers nothing. The complaint of it is that in providiug for a new duty it confers upon another otticer instead of upon the township and city offlcers. In this there is nothing unusual. Shcriffs in many States are collectors of taxes, and in this State they have always in some coutingencies been collectors. It is true, that in eollecting this tax, the Sheriff acts on behalf of the ínunicipalities, but so he does in auy case where the tax warrant is delivered to liitn, au l o the County Treasurer and Auditor-General in eollecting taxes, for they collect the local taxes aawell as those levied for State purposes. The whole tax systcm is something in which the State at largo is coucerncd, and the rules by which it niay be made to opérate harmoniously cannot bc ruled inflexible as not to yield to circunistancea when the Legislature deerns it essential. Kut there is another eonsideration that is conclusive on this point. This objection, like the last, is supposed to find its support in the reasouing of this court in People vs. Hulbert, 24 Mich., U. But in that case we took especial pains to show that for some purposes the townships, villages and cjties of the State could not be permitted to act mdependently but were and must be subject to compulsión of the State. The case of taxes for general purposes was espeeially instanced, and it was said the I mxmiciualities could not be left to collect these or to refuse to colleot them at thcir om vqhtion ; tney must collect them, and they must sustain local govcrnment whether willing or uot. Xo that extent every part of tlie State was coiicemed in tne actiou of cvery other part, becauso disorder in onc locality would derange more or Icbs tüo whole syetem. In the previous ca.3c of People vs. Mahaney, 13 Mich., 487 ït had been decided that the State has power to take control of the pólice of the city ; and this waa cited with approval in People vs. Hulbert, on the expresa ground that the pólice of the State and the preaervation of order in every locality was a matter of State concern and not of mere local interest. It requires no argument to demónstrate this The effect ipon tlie whole State of abrogatmg ocal government in a single city or townahip, and lcaving cverything to disorder and to the unrestrained pase'ions of bad men, would inevitably be peruieious beyond eBtimate. ■N ow the law under consideratiou, thollgh haying rcveuue for one object, has the pólice of the State lor another It waa deemed important to adopt it as a matter of public regulation. The Legislaturc saw ttt not to leavc it to tlie locamies 10 eniorce u or uui it tbcir option, and it is a matter of reasonable '. ference Uiat they refrain fromdoing so, becausc the ; rcfusal oí a locality to cnforce it would introduce ; disorder into tlie system. Whether that was the reason or not,they had, as we think, an unquestionable right to make all such provisions as they deemod esseatial to preclude the possibilüy of the law beiug müliftcd in any qnarter. K to accomphsh this it va (Uemed CBsential to recommit the cxecution of the law to county, instead of municipal, oflicers, we know of nothing to preclude it. There is certainly uothin" in the previous decisión of this court that i incoñi-iatent with this feature of the law. 5 The objection wMcli appears to be püncipally elied upon is that a tax on the traille in liciuors nder this law is equivalent to a license of the trafc and therefore comes dircctly in conñict wiui lát provifion of the Constitution which declares lat "the Legislature shall not pass any act author.iuft the grant of licenso for the sale of ardent nirits, or other.intoxicating liquois. ' Couit.art. sec 7. In order to arrive at the exact mcaning 'f this 'provisión, and to show what the people and he couveution had in view and inteuded to acomplish in adopting it, no littlo industry has been xu.udedinsiitingthe procee.'iQga of the convenion and in briuging bcfore uu the expresión oí ■iews by the different members of that body npon the subject of t.e liquor tr..fflc. But one needs to give verylittle attention to the proeccdmp in order to be onvinced-what in fact is a part of public history of the time-that inenib.TB ot the convention who expressed views leading to the same reslilt in shapiug the instrument to Ie subnutted to the poople had objects in view wliich wcre totally difleraS aud expected, or at loast hoped, to accoinplish whollv different end by meaus of the provisión linally agreed upon. The provisión itself is experimental, and no onc could eaiely predict the oonseaawcM ; bnt while those who f avored the total deatriK-tion of the trame in ardent spirits, to accom plish that object by lueaua of a pruhlbltlou of 11„„u Dtlwn not vrtjllsa to destroy the trad;, arded the inhibition of license as a rcnioval oí emburamfng ri'Ktrictions and impedimento. The provisión ageeed npon was not iu itself a yrobimtiou oí the tralBc, and npon thia tlic most diverse views miKht be concentra' ed; but beyond this thore wa no harmonv oí purpono whatover. With license prohibitaü, a úroad field was still left for lrewlaüou, aad eacli sidc miglit hope to obtaiu the advsntage in tbat and not to lind the coiistitutioual provisión i] - terpóse any serioiw obatocle. For tírese reasoin the proceedingB oí the Coustitutioual Couvtntion are, as nearly as tosbíUp, worthleas for giviug aid ín th CODütructlon of this provisión, and we i;;m mly take it as it stands, and seuk thc meauing in the word emploved to expreffi it. Dore then a tax upa the truBic in Bquorfl come wiüün the condeninatiou of this provisión oi t ConsUtnüon a l.eing equivalent to a Uoense ol tte trafflo? I it tho same m legal effect, i.r i tm HUI acoording tO Ihc popular luis ol ..- tena ltoense? ïhi íb &e juesüon fliat pirnts it 11 for decisión on this branoh of tln' '"■"■ Thèpopuia understandiug ol ti... wnrd UoeBse unfloabtedly i a perml8ioB te .lo Bometbing wlm-h withont théVensewld notbe alUnvable J h n v,,. are u, uppoe was UJe ii In I made use of in the ( 'onstitution ; but this is also the legal meaning. The object of a lieonse, saya Mr. Jiistirc Maiming, istoconfrr a right that does not exist without a licenBe. Chilvers vb. Feoptf, 11 Midi., 48, 4S. Witfcin this deflnltioa a orare tax apon the trafflo cannotbc a lieense of the trafilo imlees the tax conicrs somt' right to oarryon thetraffic whtch otherv.-iëo would not have existeá. We do not nndtrntnnd that sueh la t)ie case here. The very act which imposcd thia tax repealed the previons law which forbade the traffic and declared it illegal, The trado then became luwt ui whether taxed or not. ; and thi law in Imposing the t;i did not declare the trade Utegft] in ene the tax was not paid. So far as we can perceivü, a failure to pay the tax no more rendors the tradc illegal than would a lilte failure of a farmer to pay the tax on his farm rendcr its culüvation illegal. The State has iinposed the tax in each case, and made such provisión as has been deemed needfut to inmire its payment; but it has not seen fit to ruake the failure to pay a forfeiture of the rightto piirnnc the calling. If the lax iti paid the traüic is lawful, but if not paid the traffle i equally lawful. 1 here is consequently nothing in the case that appearsto be in the nature of a tteebse. The State has provided for the taxation of a business whieh was fonnd in existonce, and the carrying on of whtoh it no longer prohibits ; and that is all. But it is urged that by taxing the buainesR the State recogni7.es its lawful character, sanctions its existence, and participates in its profitp, all of which is wittain the real intent of the prohibitioD of UcenBe. 'ihe lawfuIncHD of the business, if by tha we uuderstand ít is no longer pimishable and is capable of conhtituting the basis of contraéis, waa imdoubtedly recogni.ed when the prohibitnry law was repealed; but aB the illegality of the trafhe depended on the law so its lawfulness ncw depends upon its repeal. The tax has nothing to do wlth it wha'ever. Now it ia not claimed, bo far as we are aware, that the repeal of the prollibitoiy law was incompetent ; and it not,niere recognition of the lawf ulnessof the traille cannot make the tax law or any other law invalid. it is only the recognition of an existing and a conceded fact, and the courts could not refuse to recogüize it if ttaey would. The idea that the State lends its countenance to any particular traflic by taxing it Beems to us to rest upon a very trauaparent fallacy. It certainly overlooks or disregards some ideas that must always underlie taxation. Taxea are not favors, they are burdens. They aro necessary, it ia true, to the exiHtence of government ; but they are not the less burdens, and are only subniitted to because of the neceöfity. It is deemed adviaable to make careful provisión to preclude these burdens beconiin& ueedlessly oppressive ; but it is conceded by all the aathoritiea that under some circumstances they may be carried to an extent that will be ruinoue to individual. It would be a remarkable propofütlon, under Kuch circumstanoee, that athingis sanefcioned and countenanced by the governnieut, when this burden, which may prove disastrous, is impoBed upon it, while on the other hand it is frowned upon and condemned when the bucden is withheld. It is eafe to predict that if such were the legal doctrine, any citizen rould prefer to be visited with the untaxed frownn of government rather than with testimoniáis of approv.l which are represente d by the demands of the tax-gatherer. It may be suppotsed tuat some idea of special protection is in vol ved when a business is taxed, taxatiou and protection being reciprocal. If the tax upon any particular thing was the consideiation for the thing given to the owner in respect to it, this might be so; but the niaxim of reciprocity in taxation haa no eucli meaning. No government ever undertakes to tax all it protects. If a f. overnment were to levy only poll taxen, it would not bc on the idea that it was to protect only the persons of lts citizen, lca"ing thcir property open to rayúne and plunder. In this State our taxee are derived uaiüly from real estáte; but it aas never been suggented tliat real estáte Waa entitled to special consideration in eonsequence. In Great Britaiu ral estáte pays a relatively insigniticant iiortiou of the taxes, although in the social and political state it is more important thaii all other property. As a general fact the United States has not taxed real property, and, thotlgh during the recent rebellion it taxed most kinds of business for war purpoees, the nuniber of subjects taxed has buen several times reduced by legislation since, and niay reasonably De expected to be further reduced hereafter. But the business taxed is no more protected tlian the business not taxed ; and the fisheriee which are favored by bountiea are as muck protected as cither. All this is only an apportionment of taxation by the selection of eubjects which, under all the circumstances, it is deemed wise and politie to subject to the burden. Whether a pereon in reBpect to nis property or his occupation falls v.-ithin the category of taxables or not is immaterial as affecting his claim to protection from the govermnent. It is enough forhim that the government has selected for itself its own subjectB for taxation and prescribed its own rules. It is his liability to taxation at the will of tho government that entitles hini to protection, aücl not the cireximstance of his being actually taxed, and the taxation of a thing may be, and often is, when pólice poses are )md in viev-, j means oí expressmg ( approval instead of approbation ot what is táxed. . Tliere has umloubteclly been feit and expressed a ' istroUR sentimental objeetion to tiie doing of 1 thing by the State that eren seeined to be a lemling 1 of its countenance to a business which the , jectors regarded as evil in itself, especially to the Otate participatie g in tlie pronta of a pernicious ] trade. iïut the objeetion never found expression in laws forbidding the taxation of liquots or of the business of dealing in thein. Indeed, in thie State, liquors hve always becn taxable as property; and so have been the impleiuents by means of which forbidden gaines of chance have been carried on. Yet when the keeper of billiard tables is compellcd to pay a tax it can bc no deiense to him either m law or in mofals that he is compelled to do so from the pronta of an illegal business. To refuae to receive the tax under such circumstances would tend to cnconrage the Imtiiufss inBtead of restraining it ; and would not only be unwise bccause of exempting one man from his fair share of taxation, but also because it would tend to defeat the State policy which forbids games of chance or hazard. The idea that if a thiug is favored becauee it is taxed may be exammed m the light of the practico of this State in some other particwlara. It has alwayH been the custom in appoi-tioning taxes by valuation to make some disenminations based ou reasons of public policy. As an illustration we may mention the case of property devoted to educational or charitablc purposes, and which as a rule has been exempted Jrom general taxatiou. The general belief haa been that the Interests and i fare of the whole community would be best subserved by abstainiug from auy imposition of the burdens of government upon suoh property, and the Legislature, in apportioning the t;ixea, has i cepted this general belief and acted upon it. It lias been dune as a matter of favor and by way of i ïgement, and yet if the argument againet the tax in this case is sound we do not see why this State should not havo evidenced its approbation of educational and chnritable institutionsby taking spec-al care that they should feel its burdens, while at the same time it Btigmatized other things which were regarded as iinmoral or pernicioiiB by refusing to permit them to aipear on the tax roll. A tax roll miiiht undoubtedly be made in this manner a roll of reputable ñames, or even a roll of honor, bul how, any soumi public policy would be subserved by it must reqnire considerable ingenuity to point out. It would assurcdly not be such policy aa States have usually acted upou. While in the selection of óbjects f or taxation, revenvie is to be considered and kept in view, it is impossible to exchule other considerations. In proporing a tax it might always be a (luestion whether it should be imposed npon persons ; or upon property by value, and if so, upon what property ; or upon business, and if so, what kinds of business ; or whether it should not be a c mbination of all these. One incthod might be the easiest for the collectioa of tb.3 necessary revenue, hut most injurious or unequal in its results ; one might discourage industry and another encourage if one might collect the tax from luxmies and th'erefore fall maiuly upon the rich, while auother would collect it from necessaries and be oppressive to the poor ïhe wholc queetion would be quii e as much one of policy as of ne cessity, and a legislator would be unflt for his oflice wlio did not look bevond the proposed tax to its probable results. This is cspecially true in eveiy case where the tax has reference to pólice as well as revenue. A particular business may theu be taxed while others are spared, not only because for any reason it can best bear the burthen, butalso tecause Buch surroundings attach themselves to the business taxcd a to render Uie discouragemeut and discipline of heavy taxatiou wise anti politie. In the few cases in which the right to do this has been demed on the ground of inequaUlj, Ihe courts have afflrmed it as being beyond question . See Durach's ApT,ea,l. 83 Pcnu. St. 491, 494 : Fletcher v. Oliver, Ï5 Árk 289; State v. Parker, 32 N. J., 426, i. xne Federal govermnent has gone to a grcat extent ín the same direction; levying the dutiea in some cases whloh in their results are prohibitory ; and in the caBC of the Stato banks punosely taxing Uiem out of existerce. Veasi vs. Fenno, 8, Wall, r33. Ibis caiw does uot cali for auy exprcssíon oL opinión upou legialaiion of that extremo character, for we liávc nothing u this law that goos beyond the ordinary legislatiou wlien it is euactod for tile doublé purpose of reveuue and regulation. 'lhiB State has never showu anv inclinatiou to niake thinga moi-ally and legally wrong contribute to the public roveuue when justicc and good moráis Benied to reiiuire it. If it were to act upon tbe idea of refusing to derive a revenue from such sources, it ought to decline to receive linea for criminal offennes v.ith the samo empluma that it would refune to collect a tax from an olmoxious busineBs. If the taxes are laid byway of discourageuient or regulation, it has the ame general object iu view with the flue ; not only aB it allects the perBon taxed and tue commuuity, but also in the use to which tLc mouey is devoted. i'ct the JouBtitutiou expressly providea for a library lund, to be dtrived froín the violations of the public law (Const., irt. 13., sec. 12.,), a provisión that may a iegttoately Baid to be a license of crime aa a ta onatrafnc ma be Bld to be a license of the traille. íi . .ii.ij ; Jila Taxea upon busincBB aro uwiaiiy ooimciou m form of licensc fee; and this niay possibly have led to the idea that wenw to tare provailed ta soine quarterB,thatataximi.Ucdal.ccnsc But there is o ncccBwiry oonnectfon whatever betweeu theni. A bniuf .í.j be lkwed and yet not taxed, or it my bo toxed and yet not liceiued. And bo tl ta the tax froin beiag necensarily a licmise that provisión ia frequently made by Uw for the taxation o4 a business that is carried on un-'.er a liccnse oxistiii" ladepencleiit of the tax. Such in the ose where citios nndcr propei legisli - tivo authority tax occupatiou that are cairiod on under liceDBes from the State Oulrt vb. lticbiuoud, MGrat., ii'.l; Napier V. Hodgee, 31 Ixa, 287; :uthbcrt vb. Couley. 33 Geo., 211; Wendover va. LcxiuKton, 15 lieltonr, 258. The Uceare coufcra the privilege, but it ia not perc ived vhy pnvilece tüus conterred should not be taxed as much au auj oHier. lhe Federa) lawa (■■' B n - i'.lu-ti-ation oí ffie O ion of Dleg) tmfflo. A m In p.m. ■■ ;ü „ï the taxstton ol Um Uquor tr ' ','" s l;,i v .V rious-toöw repealof toe Vi-ol.Hu.ry la-.v . t e 1. 1U wtthout andertaking to give it "WP' wbatever. BoOnije ra. ""■■ "'i ' 'mPOr a. Com., 5 Wall, 475. What would have prevented ie State from taxin? the Müna traftie at the. same me? Ih it any more rentricted in tbr nelettion of ibjectB of taxation than the gt-ucral governlent is ? If oiie may tax and the name time refuse i pi-otoct. may iiot the other do the same? The uly reason euggruted tor a negativo rtply to these upptiou i that it was the ritate melf, uot ttio Jnited Stat-, that made the business illegal, and it ■ould be hifoimstent and absurd to declaro i ülegal and ít same tune tix it. üi:t ow the lnoonristcy wonlA appcm1 in ne rase rathi t fchau tbe other, i uot appareot. 'hc illogjiJity was declared by ■- mpeteci authority, nd yt the Federal govrrnnicnt taxed the trade, iit he name time rofoslng or belng ablo to protect it. f protectiou beuanse ot the tax was due (so the very thlng npon which Hip tax was bnposed there would be an incon8iht,ncy in taxirifí a plDhlblted trade; bnt treating taxation, however aud whcrf:vcr it may fall, as tltt return for thn general beneflts of goyerameBtZ-fnr the proteetwn to life, llbérty, the social and famity rrlai ions, an wt:ll as to business and iiropcrty- whicli in the only legal and proper idea Of taxation, there is no inconpisteuc whatevcr in maklsg a ihiiifi whioh is not protected ono of tho mcaeurcB or tandards by which to determine how mnch the party owningor supporting it oubt topay to the government. lf one puts the government to special incouvenieiici; and oost by kt eping up a prohibfted trafflo or malntalnlng a niüsance, the fact la a reason for dtecrlrainatlug la taxation againit him ; and if the tax La imposed oii the thlng wnichis'pTohibitedoT which constttutes the nuiaance, the tax law, tnstead oí belng tnconsiatent wiLH ihe law deelaring tlio Ülegality is in entirc liarinoiiy wilh ita general pnrpone, and Koim-tiiu s may bc even inore etfectual. Cettainly, whattív r diacrtmlnfltlons are made in taxatir.n oiiKht to be Lu the direefton of ïaaking the heaviest tmrthena fall apon thosfl thingR which are to tlic public interest, whenevcr that is practicable. For these reanonn wc tiiink the objecilonfl whl b have been made to the law have no validity. The. deerce of the Superior Court diBXOiasing the liill will b1? atlirmed with costs.