There is undoubtedly mucli trutli in the statement that Austria is profoundly agitatod at the near approach of war between Russia and Tnrkey, and may meditate a movement into Herzegovina and Bosnia as an offset to the Russinn invasión of Bulgaria. The Austrians are evidently af raid that, in case of war, there may be a change of territorial status, and fear that if the Russians get across the Danube and sweep down through Bulgaria, they may absorb everything down to the Balitan mountains, and pcrkups somethiug beyond them, in which case she would be compelled to take Herzegovina and Bosnia in self-defense, rather than have Russia swallow them. The movement to occupy these two provinces, however, must of necessity iuvolve Austria in uew eomplications at home. It would change the center of gravity aud bring the Solavea to the front, outnumbering the Mngyars, and constituting the proinmont element of the population and the controlling element in the Government. The two combined would of course almost completely ovorshadow Northern or Germán Austria, the issue of which, sooner or later, would be the secession of the Germau element to Germany, thus leaving Austria to be split ngain between the Sclave aud the Magyar. The sitnation of Austria, therefore, as will be seen at a glauco, is a very peculiar one. She would liko to oecupy tlie Sclavic provinoes, and yet is afraid'to do it. It is a itropg temj)tatiou, and yet, if she yiclds to it, her dual form of government must iuvolve in new and critical complications. It is a necessity that she should oecupy tliom, mñ yet, if she doos, it may result in the rearrangemeni of the nmp of Austria. - Chicago Tribune.