Jury Decided Farrington Was Guilty of Manslaughter

Adrian, Mich., Feb. 6—After deliberating for three hours this afternoon the jury in the case of Burt Farrington of Milan, charged with the murder of his wife's paramour, Jesse Hooker of Adrian, brought in a verdict declaring the prisoner guilty of manslaughter.

It was 5:45 when the jury gave notice that a verdlct had been agreed upon. The prisoner, judge, clerk and attorneys were hastily summoned, and at 6:10 the jury entered.

It was a nerve-racking moment. The prisoner, J. B. Farrington, sat between his brother Ed. and his brother-in-law, John S. Bray. There was no outward indication of the feelings which had been stirring them as the twelve jurors filed solemnly to their places, but they were profoundly serious. The court room was occupied by about 100 men, many of them Milan friends of Farrington, who were resolved to see the end. Congressman Smith and C. E. Baldwin came to represent the prisoner.

"Gentlemen, have you agreed upon your verdict?" said Clerk Kline.

"We have," said several voices.

"What is your verdict?" he asked.

Juror James B. Haight as foreman arose and pronounced the single word, "Manslaughter."

The maximum penalty in the case is fifteen years in the state's prison, minimum not exceeding $1,000 fine. When the verdict was rendered about 100 friends from Milan were surrounding the prisoner. The quickness of the verdict surprised everybody. 

NERVE STOOD BY HIM.

There were a few formalities. The people had been warned by the court to make absolutely no demonstration. Farrington looked downward into his hands, which were knotted together by his fingers. Ed. Farrington allowed his forehead to drop forward slightly so it rested on his hand, shading his face. Tears came into many eyes. Several men crowded around Farrington and shook his hand in a grip of earnest sympathy that drew tears to his eyes. He said nothing, not trusting his voice to reply to their whispered sentences.

The jury took nine ballots. On the first one six stood for acquittal. None of the jurors favored murder in the first degree, but one or two stood for murder in the second degree. The The discussion grew heated but not acrimonious.

The prevailing sentiment was that Farrington knew what he was about, but ought to be let off as easily as possible under that theory. Had he found Hooker in his own home and killed him then and there he would have been acquitted without doubt, said one juryman, but through the pursuit to Adrian and the delay it was not possible under the law as glven by the court to let him go scot free.

There was a strong feeling in the jury to bring in a recommendation for a light sentence, but it was not done, as the jury felt that it might be going too far outside its duties.

BONDSMEN READY.

The case will be appealed. In the morning Judge Chester will fix the amount of bail, and several of Farrington's Milan friends told Congressman Smith that any amount the court should fix would be furnished immediately. Sentence will be stayed pending the appeal.

Prosecutor Sampson occupied the entire forenoon session of the court, concluding his argument of the people's case in the Farrington trial. He ridiculed Sawyer's claim of justification under the law, and declared he was ashamed of Congressman Smith for saying, "Under the same circumstances, I'd kill him a thousand times. I would suffer the torments of the damned rather than let him go," referring to Jesse Hooker. Such language was advocating Kentucky and Texas civilization for Lenawee county. Sampson demanded sympathy for young men, led astray by immoral women, as Hooker had been. The husband of the guilty woman was not at liberty to wreak his anger and vengeance on the seduced young man. He poured hot shot into the defense of transitory mania.

Judge Guy M. Chester's charge to the jury was a voluminous document of  25 typewrltten pages, and notably impartial. Its utterances on the right of a man to slay another caught in adultery with his wife were strong. He declared positively against there being any such right recognized by law. He held, however, that the jury might determine from the surrounding circumstances whether or not the killing was the result of premeditation and malice, in which case it would be murder either in the first or second degree; or unpremeditated, the result of an uncontrollable passion excited at the moment of the discovery of the guilty relation, in which case it would be manslaughter. Of course, if the killing was done while the defendant was insane, whether the insanity were transitory mania or some other form of the disease, it was not the act of the defendant, and the verdict should be not guilty.

"Manslaughter," said the judge, "is an offense that is committed without malice and without premeditation, the result of a passion or temporary excitement by which the control of the reason is destroyed, rather than any wickedness of the heart, cruelty or recklessness of disposition. You will observe that I have said that in voluntary manslaughter a provocation must have been offered by the deceased.

"What is sufficient provocation to reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter you must decide. The ordinary human nature, or the average of men, recognized as men of fair average mind and disposition, should be taken as the standard, unless or until the defendant has been shown to have some peculiar weakness of mind or infirmity of temper.

"In determining whether the provocation was sufficient to produce the state of mind that I mentioned, you are instructed that it must be such provocation the tendency of which would be to produce such degree of passion and disturbance as I have mentioned in the mind of ordinary men, and if you find from the evidence in this case the conduct of the deceased with defendant's wife did produce that effect on the mind of the defendant, and the killing was the result of such provocation, and the excitement and passion which arose thereby, and there was not sufficient cooling time after this provocation, then you can only convict defendant of manslaughter."