Constitutional Obligations

But perlinps Dr. Biisbane maystilldesire inswers to his question, though, on roading the retmrks of Mr. Webster, he should concur in this view of (hem. "Have we a moral right to swear to support a constitution which requires us to carry out the enactments of a majority, even though our own conviction should be that the enactment is nn immoral one ? And is this required by the Constitjtion of the United States ? To the first queslion, we answer, No ! Can any other nnswer bc given ? Flave we a moral right to do wrong ? Have we a moral right, then, to pledge our word or oalh to do wrong T So plain is the pnth of duty on this subject that sucli questions answer themselves. Does the Constitution, then, require those who swear 1o support it, "to carry out the enactments of a majority, even though their own convictions should be that the enactment is an immoral one V' If so, it is plain no person of enlightened morality can take office under it. - Every such per?on knows that God only is Supreme, and that t would be treason to Him to assume a position in ivlrch by oath or affirmation he would be bounc," to carry out what he believed to be an "mmorol" enactment : for, what is an "immoral" enactment ? One that is repugr.ant to moralily ; but moraliiy is simple conformity to the laws of God. If, then, the public will in a Democracy, acting I through a majority, ascertained by the farms of the Constitution, enact an immorality, in oiher tvords, non-conformity to Divine law, the only queslion for an nc-! countible being to decide is, who is ! preme - God or man f The decisión of this question,if he Le a man of cnnscience, j WÜI make him a non-conformist eitherto' the Divine Law or the Human Law. If! to the latter he shows that he I edges the supremacy of llie Creator ; f i to the former, he demoustrntes th.it he is a practica', if nol tlieoretical, Atheïst. It is, therefore, a question of thá high est importarice to asceriain what the Constituiion does require of the ofnee-holder. j Let us take the case of a member elect of the United States House of Representa-' tives. Ile is called upon to swear tu stip j)ort the Federal Conslituliun. What does the oath imply ? lst. That he will recognisp, w lint is nísrmed as a general principie n the Confctltutioii, the right of a mnjority, ascertained hy constitutional forms, to ru'e - Is not this print-ijle, as u general one. reasnnablc and neecssanj ? '2. That h? will not only aWtain, himsplf, from violent mensures ngaintt ihe Consiitution, but opposö violent ine-i.siirr directed by o hers against it. Is not this n asemab'e, nr.d enjoinrd by the principies of Chrirtinrritj ? ;!. That in his official course he wil: confine Iiimself to the sp'iere of du'iesasitigned to the Rcpresentative by the ConKtitution, Hischaiging the particular du:ps it imposes upon him, and using the discretionarv power it vests in him, accorditig lo his own best jiHgment. If a man of enlightened cor.science, lie wül inquire whetlier any dutv repugnant to muralhy be positively imposed upon him, anti, ;is one of the independent Repi-esenlatives of the Sovereign Peoplo, whüe a'. ailing himself of tlie researchea i-f ótherS, he will decide for himself, wilk eiüire independence, rogu'ating his actssolely by his i.wn convictions. If he fi nel a duty, il) his delilieratn judgment, positively erijuinrd on him by the Consiituti'm, rnd yei in riirect conflict with his own convictions nf r'ght, tiiere is but one course lefi fur him as an honcst man - let him resign ; for, if he swear to support that Constitution, he mu$t become a traitor, eithor to God or man. This three-fold obligntion is al! ihnt is inulied, so far as we can ser, in an oalh or affirmation, to suf.port ihe Conslitulijn of the United States. It does not bind the Represeniative to "carry out the enactments of a mnjority" ngainst his own convictions, even though they relate merely to expediency, and not consideraiions of right or wrong. He is to decide on thé meritsof o bil] fur himself. If lic believe it wrong, no matier what it proposes, whether peace tvar, abolition or slavery, he is bound to onpose it. He may speak against if, caucus against it, try lo kill it by amendmenl, b: file it by reference, defeal it by adjouniment - in mimerous ways provided by the rules of both Houses of Congress, strive to change or withstand the wül of a mnjority. If ii pass ono House, he may, by expostuhtion with his frienrfs in the other, continue his waruponit. Through all its stages, up to the moment when it receives the signature of the President, he may wage war against it. When it hns bpcome n law, he may still denounce it, steadfiistly oppose ever subsequent measuve iniended or necessary to carry it into effect, nnd, at the proper time, bring in a bilí for its repeal. He may do all this, nnd yet violate neither the letter nor spirit of tho Constitution ; for his oatli of office does not bind him "to carry out the enactments of a majority ;" fit did, he would cease to be a free man, and Congress would no Jonger be a deliberntive, free assembly. His single duty, under this aspect of the case is, submission lothe ennctmen'.when t Yerimr-: ltw : kul ll) is r fyty of the Citizen as well as the Representative - a duty enjoined by reason and religión; unless indeed the circumstances are such as lo justify a revolulion, the right of which no gorernment recognizes, though il is claimed by communities of men, in the last resort, on grounds of which the Supremo Ruler of Nations alone can judge. We have dwelt upon the case of the Representative. Take that of the President of the United States. Bolh Houses pass a bilí, by greater or less majorities. No imtter if unanimously, the Constitution itself confers on the President the power to sign it, or veto it, just as he may "approve" or disnpprove; that is, it gives him express power to prevent the enactment of a majority from being carried out. But should !wo thirds of each House take up the rejected bill and pass it, il becomes a law, and the President is bound to see "ihe laws faithfully executed." Suppose it be his delibérate, deep conviction that it is "inmoral," what shall he do ? He is bound by hts allegiance to :he Consiitution, to carry it out, and by hs allegiance to a Higher Power, to have nothing lo do with cari-} ing it out. Now, if ihis we re the sole alteinative presented - if he could do nothing else than fulfil liis oath and disobey the Supreme Ruler, or viólate his oath and obp.y the Supreme Ruler, the inference is inevitable - he ought never to have laken office as President of the United Siaie?, on such a condi'.ion, and no man of enlightened conscience can do so - for no such man will place himself in a position where he must sin one way or the other, commilting either perjury or some other immordlity. But this is not the sole alternative. He may resign, nnd thus save his honor and his conscience - show at once his devotion to the order of soeiely and the requirements oí his Maker. - Heacce)tfid office, and swore to support the Consiitution of the United States, bec.iuse he bclieved t imposed noduty upon any department of Government repugnant lo moralilv, and it was not fair to presume ihat two-thirds of the meniljers of eacb House of Congress would ever unite to pass an immoral enactment. Unexiectedly, they have done so; and now, having no constitutional right to defeal t lic: i r will, and no moral riglil to particípate in the responsibiliiy of such enaclment, lie does what any honorable Senilor, believing in the right of inslruction, dues,when his instructions are repugnant tr his conviclions of right - he resigns. - YV'ha'over cxtrnvugances men may u'ter abuut the obligations of the oalh of offioe, will nol soy lh;it it hinds a man la cinliirati i ti üfiice longer ihan he can do