U.s. Salvador Policy In Shambles

The failure of U.S. policy is clearly seen in the inauguration of Alfredo Cristiani, candidate of the far right ARENA (Nationalist Republican Alliance) party as the new Salvadoran president. U.S. policy has been based on creating a "moderate" alternative to the guerrillas and the Salvadoran oligarchy. José Napolean Duarté, Christiani's predecessor, was the centerpiece of this policy. The Salvadoran right accepted this strategy because it ensured continued U.S. aid for the war effort.

However, with the virtual collapse of the Salvadoran economy and the increased strength of both FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) guerrillas and the civilian popular movement, the Salvadoran right can no longer tolérate the niceties that accompanied U.S. policy, such as fewer human rights abuses. In their desire to protect their economic interests, the oligarchy and its military allies feel they can no longer operate through a front.

ARENA is the party of the death squads. It was founded and is led by Roberto D' Aubuisson, long reported to be the center of the death squad network in El Salvador and organizer of the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980. It is widely accepted that Cristiani is only a front for D'Aubuisson, as seen in the ARENA campaign slogan, "Cristiani to the presidency, D'Aubuisson to power." D'Aubuisson picked Cristiani to lead ARENA when it became clear that the U.S. would not support a D'Aubuisson presidency because of the difficulties it would present in obtaining aid from Congress.

However, with Cristiani in office and D'Aubuisson in power, U.S. aid, roughly $1.5 million a day, has continued unabated. And although there have been questions about continued U.S. aid if there are increases in human rights abuses, given the great investment of U.S. aid ($3.5 billion since 1980) and U.S. prestige, it is likely that it will continue regardless of what happens.

Since the election of Cristiani in March, human rights abuses have, in fact, increased greatly. However, the strength of the FMLN and the civilian movement, and the dependency of the Salvadoran government on U.S. aid, make it clear that any cutoff or reduction in aid would be followed by the collapse of the Salvadoran government.

At the present time, the number of disappearances, death squad killings and detentions with torture is roughly twice what it was at the same time last year (Zeta, May 1989). This repression has been directed, to a large extent, against popular organizations. The offices of many groups have been repeatedly surrounded andor searched, with equipment and files destroyed and many leaders detained. Almost all detainees reponed being tortured both physically and psychologically. The University of El Salvador continues to be encircled, with all people entering and leaving subject to search by the police.

Government repression is also being feit in the countryside, especially in areas recently repopulated by refugees returning from neighboring Honduras. Most of these communities were displaced by intensive aerial bombings and army repression in the mid-80s. Not coincidently, these communities, like most rural areas, support the FMLN. Because of this, they are once again subjected to aerial bombardments, army sweeps and the disappearance of community leaders (CISPES Alert, May 1989).

Repression of the popular movement is the government's only means of fighting since the Salvadoran Armed Forces have been unable to militarily defeat the FMLN. In fact, the armed forces have taken a beating. The FMLN operates freely in all of El Salvador's provinces and the army is suffering from 30 casualties per day. If this trend continúes, the army will endure 10,000 casualties by the end of the year (Zeta, May 1989).

Equally important, recent months have seen the phenomenal growth of urban commando units. They have demonstrated a capacity to not only destroy targets such as electrical posts or government vehicles, but to carry out rocket and mortar attacks against military installations and full-scale assaults on police stations.

Along with the urban commandos, the FMLN is organizing people's militias, part-time guerrillas that participate in above-ground organizing, clandestine sabotage missions and low-level attacks on the military.

In short, the FMLN is stronger than ever. So, too, is the popular movement. The deterioration of the economy and government repression has led to greater unity in the labor movement. Organizations such as the Movement for Bread, Work, Land and Liberty (MPTL) are working to involve more people in the struggle, especially in the marginal communities surrounding San Salvador.

This situation is a new one. In the early 80s, the popular movement was strong, but the guerrillas were comparatively weak. Government-organized death squads, by murdering literally tens of thousands of people, were able to prevent the popular organizations from achieving many successes. After the decimation of the popular movement in the mid-80s, the FMLN was stronger, presenting the armed forces with a serious challenge. Without the urban support of popular organizations, however, the FMLN was able to do little.

Now both sectors are strong. When the government attacks a popular organization, the FMLN now has the capacity to avenge the attack. It is doubtful that the FMLN can win outright, but the work of many organizations is putting the country on an insurrectionary footing.

The role of the solidarity movement here is clear. We must pressure our government to cut off aid to the death squad government now in power. The guerrillas, both in urban and rural áreas, are strong and mass support for them, shown through the popular organizations, is at an all-time high. All that is lacking for the final blow is a cutoff of U.S. aid.