How General's Are Made

War ofton works great and sudden ♦ransfonnations. It lifts up one and puts down anothcr vi;h an alinost despotic au ♦f.o.-ity. It u a touchstone that brings out to vitw the native character aud real spacity of aypiranta for military oommand. Ho m whom there is the stuff froni which a great commandcr is made becomes manifest, wbilo all the artificial glitter taat uiay have surrounded the inompetent offiuer in time of peace is jtripped away. On uno occasion, an officer in the army of tlio first Napoleon solicited the batou of a Marshal. " It is not I that uiako Marshal.-",' said Napoleon; " it is Tictories." Capacity for coainiand, pro ▼en by the emcrgeneiej, was what ho required. He asked for what he was acoustomed to ca!l "a military head " in hira who wished to be tho head of military moveinents. (Jhanges aniong an army's superior offieer, except for iinperative reasons, are to be depreeated. The period of transition from the control of one officer to the direction of another, is liablo to be a easou of disaster. And if it is not fraught ir i tb positivo danger to the army, jet it is likely to bo a seagon of comparativo ineffioiency. Such changc6 should only be made for cogeut military reasons, to bo decided upou by competeut mili tary authority. The demands of civilians for military fhanges cannot safely be allowed great eignt,because their opinions on suoh iaijjecta re so liablc to the supicion of rror. The judgment of the civilians of the opposition, wtw flourished half a century ago on tiie hastihgs and in the Brit iêli Pailiament, was utterly adverse to the eont nuance of the Peninsular War; if it had beeu allowed to decide, it would have deposed Wclliugton from his comni aod at any time bötwöen his first land ing at Mondego Bay and his last conflict t St. Sebastian. The rcsult of the campaign, however, and the final expulsión ef the Freuch from Spain, fully justified tlio sagacity of Lord Castlereagh in the electiou of the commanding officer, and the wisdom of Wellington in his plans for tho prosecution of the strife. But wben compettüit military authorities deeide, frora evidence presented, that any officer has not the cspacity for a general eominand, we must choose tho smaller evil, and he qjust yield bis placeIt is by succes that a General is finally to be madu - juccess n a large and eomprehensive military view. This is what Napoleon meaut. lie never de inanded, as the price of tho Marshal's baton, a record of advances, with no rotreata, successes with no reverses, gains with no loases. Ho well knew that men njay lose battles, yet win campaigns; that ♦hov may err at particular points, yet fully compénsate for thcir mistakes by ♦he magnitude of the grand resulta which they achieve. The achieving of fiual resulta was, in his esteem victory - such victories made the Marshal. - Phil. Initircr. t" Men who endeavor to look fierce by cniiivating profuso whiskerp, must ke hair-etn senre-em fellows.