Reasons Of Failure

Viwcd strategetically Charlston hurbor fonns a cul de sao four milos in length trom its entranee at Foi t 8umpter up to j the city. Tuis blind passage varics in ! widtli frota one to tliree luilea, and is capable of bearing defensivo -works on i eaeh side on shoal places ia mid-channo!. On these natural advantages have been i brougbt to bear the finest engineering I skill ia the (Jonfederacy (ud it was the flower of the genius of the country) during a period of two years. Lee, Beauregard and Ripley in su'-cession have exhaustcd their profesional cfforts to mak ' it impregnablo. Everything tliat the ; ino.st improved modern artillery and unlimited resources oi laborean do has been 1 done to make the passage of a tleet impossible. And it is impregnable. Scvaetopol was nothing to it. üur fleet got but to the entramee of the harbor ! It. neeer got within it. Had the ironclads 1 succeeded inipassing the obstructions they wmild stil 1 have found thoae miles of batteries to run ïhey wouldiiave eni tered m Iuferuo which, like the portals ;of Dante's heil, miglit well boar the flamiog legend, " Who enters here leaveh hope behind." Not a poiut at whieh they would not have t'ouud theinselvcs " Mid upper, notlier, and surroiinding fires." Thoy pa?s out of the focus of fire of Forts Sumpter and Moultrio, Ueauregard and Bee and thoy find themse'vcs arrested under the ranges of Sumpter, the Itcdnn," Johnston and Kipley. They get beyond this, and a conceutric fire from llipley, Pinckney, the Wappoo battt-ry, and the guns of the city fall upon them ! Merely to run by batteries, as was done at the forts below New Orleans, is riot a 1 very dimciilt thing even for vessels not iron-clad ; but to be anchored as it were uuder suoh fires as these is what no ships wero ever called upon to suffer. I think I ara justifiud in saying that the Admiral and bis staff and the Captains commanding the iron fleet have all along well understood tbe task that was given tliem to do, and that Ihey entertain no illusions regarding it. But both the Navy Department and the public hare illusions ss to tho nature of the work to be done and delusion as to the instruments with whieh it has to be done. - ! They saw all the weaknesses of the mooitors as well as the strengt!). They knew that their working depended on nice me ohanical combinations easilv deranget Tlhey knew that tbeir powers had neve been tested. But with tbe usual liberal logic tha characterizes tliem our people took every thing for granted. Ilere was a universa panacea for all our üIb. Here was a key I to ulock all riddles. Take theae ironclads, saya tbe Navy JDepartmout, knock Sumpter into a brickpile, and sail proudly up to deinand tbo surreader of Charleston. Indeed, so preposterously did the gov eminent regard the matter, that it was not even thought uecesüary to have a cooperating land expedition. It will as tound the country to learu that the wbole force whieh Gen. Huuter could spare from bis limited coinmand was under seven Ihousand men. Of course he coulc do nothing agaiust tLe foree ready to op pose him. From information I reeeivec from the Spanish consul, wlio carne out from that city a few weeks ago, the rebc troops for the defenee of Charleston numbered at the time 55,000 men, aud tlieir railroad facilitiea would eaaily enable thein, in tweuty-four hours, to bring the forcé up to a hundred thousand. Gen. Hunter fraukly told Admiral Dupont that he could do nothing to aid him. He coula garner in what the navy reached, but he could do nothiue in .the heat and labor of the field. The military force, indeed, never got any further up than Stono Iiilet, a dozen miles from Charles' ton harbor, where it was to effect a landing on Folly Islaud for the purpose of makhg a diversion. I can make no report of what was done, if auythiug, but it had no direct bearing on the business in hand. Thus left aloue, the naval chief had eleven huidred men (the whole force of the iron fleet,) with which to takc aud hold a dozen forts Í Could the ecstasy of folly furthey go ? These intimatious, however, will overshoot the mark if they convey the im pressiou that Adtniral Iupont lacked faith in the enterprise, or that he entered upon it unwilliualy. It was in fact, no case for either a blind faith or an unrea soning skepticism. Too little was known, as well of' the real character of the rebel dfenses as of the true nidrits of the iron-clad vessíils, to justif'y Uie une atti tude or the other. It was absoiutely neocssary to try oertain experimenta as the basis of any defiuite plan of sicge - for it was never thought it would be less than a ton days affair. The operatious of yesterday, thereforo, may be rogarded in the light of a rectmuoissance The reconnoissauce resultod in a repulse, thougb uot a disaster That it was not so is due to the admirable skill of our naval leaders Ia the prooess we have learut valuablo lessons. And novp it remains truc to day as ever, that Charleston may still be successfully assailed. - But that will begin to be possible for us when, casting oli' cliildish illusions as to special arins, an ade.juate expedition sharll be sent, military as well as naval, and in whioh the navy shall ouly be re quired to play its legitímate part. Lí5Lip All the uivilians littelv roleased (rom rioutlicrñ prwoní urn! sent North on their parole, have been uxulianged. &'S' 'l''ie rebel Secrotary of the Trea.sury says that hè eslimates bis expenses for ihe next six monttis at $50,000,000 per inonth. SS" öon. Sohenck has suspended two connty papers in Marylund, and ordered both editora within the Confedérate linos for publishing what was diHiinud trcasonablc articles.