Europe

The great importance of the war on the Danube to the world must depend on how far the European Governnients are draw a into it. The insurgen t provinces niight hold the Turkish arniy at bay for years, or Servia inight succeed in establ'ishing a considerable Sclavonic state, which should be under the nominal suzeraiuty of Turkey, and yet the peace of Europe be not endangered. Bui the day ou which au Austrian corps crosses the Danube, or a Eussian arrny enters the Principalities, or an Englisli fleet supports the attackiug columns of the Porte, then begin complicatious and dangers to Europe, and distnrbauoes to the peace of the world whose oud no man can foresee. It; is the posaibility oí such interference which makes the exchauges of Trance, England, and Germany so sensitive. How far is there danger of such an intorvention, and how great is the probability of a serioua . disturbance of the peace of the worid ? The threateuing power is unquostionably Russia. Her people, though belonging to the northsrn branch of the Sclavonic race, are in ihe deepest sympathy with the trials and sulïorings of thoir brethren under ;he rule of the Ottomans. The Turk is ïheir historical enemy also, and equally liated. Every instance Of Mussulman bigotry and cruelty to the rayah, every insult to the Greek Ohurch, every tale of oppression and sufl'ering among the [oüg-injured Sclavonians, passes from mouth to mouth among the Eussian peasantry, and the masses burn to jvenge these wrongs, and to fulflll the Kussian destiny, wliioh is to drive the Molüimmedans from Europe. These feelings and theso traditions are much stronger with a lialf-civilized peasantry like the Muscovite than in more artificial communities. In the political and govtrniug class there is also i groat desire to wipe away the disgrace of the Crimean c;impaigu, and an ambition to advance the Eussian cagles toward the Dardaoielles. The glorious prize of Constantinople still hangs glittering before the ambitious members of the niling house and before the imagination of the military leaders. These are some of the motives and forces pressing to an inferenco. On the other hand, are even more powerful influcnoes constraining to peace. Eusia, since emancipation and the Crimean war, has become a conserva ti ve governraent. Hor own internal affairs are much more difficult and dangerous since the íreedom of the serfs than bofore. She Uas entcred on the commercial and banking era of her progress, .and money-making tends to peace. She has learned the power of the civilized states of Europe, md has not that confidence in her military genius or that ambition wnich Napoleon's wars encouraged or implanted. The Czar himself is anxious f or peace, and, Ihougk tho Young Russia party are eagor for war, his influenoe must be controlling. Moveover, all the military movements of Eussia must be govorned absolutely by those of Germany ; and there is every reason to believe that, liowever much Bismarck may seek to ally the Czar with the Germán Kaiser, Iris interests and purposes are all on tüe side of peace. Interfcrenco by Eussia means inevitably war with Austria, and perhaps with England, which might renïer tho chances of winning Constantinople more remote than ever, and even leave Turkoy still more strongly in trenched in Europe than before. Thase motives must outweigh with the Eussian Cabinet any possible present advanïages from assi'sting the insurgente or allying with Servia. Austria is even more bound to a condition of non-interference. She is struggling with debt, weighed down by :axes and an irredeemable currency, and aer councils divided by the most serious difterences between tho two parts of the "Dual Empire.'' Her Selavonic subects number some four millions, and hese are already assisting Bosnians and Servians by the most liberal aid of means and men. A war in alliance with Turkey woukï. be in the highest degree unpopular in Sclavonic Huugary, and would defeat the great policy of the Vienna Cabiuet - to array the Croat and Serb agalnst the Magyar, and thus govern both. The Austrian Empire is clearly in no condition for war. In England, certainy, no war would be more against the Copular liberal feeling than one to support Turkish cruelty and oppression jver the insurgent provinces. Nothing int the most urgent necessity could possibly bring Great Britain into the strife on the Danube,'and that on the side of the Mussulman against the Christian. We ïold, then, that all these forces will keep oack the great European powers, and ;hat tho effort of all wi'l be to " localize" the struggle.