The Oriental Conflict

Russia has evidently gained all from the conference she eould have oxpected. She has now united Eiirope on her side so far as moral influence is concerned. 8he has gained Several invaluable months for needful preparationB. The mobilization of her arinies bus evidently been a grand fiasco. The Russian journals are not permitted to report the movements of troopp, but enougii leaks out to show that largo botlies of men were kept for days at little stations waitiug for transportaron ; that provisions and water failed, and the utmost confusión prevailed. Many regiments proved, too, mero skeletons, so that Rixssia seemed in somesnchcondition as Francs before the last war. This, however, by the lapse of thenecessary time, has been remedied, and the empire is every dny girdlng itself for the struggle. A certain change has, it ia true, come over the popular spirit ; but this is probably no more than the serïonsness which al-, ways precedes a groat war, and the discontent which official stupidity and maladministration produce in all countries. We observe that ccrtain military writers in Èurope predict an easy "promenade " of the ilussian armies from the Prath to Constantinoplo. This is altogether improbable. Any one who reads Moltke's account of the campaign between Rusi?ia and Turkey in 1828-9, in which he served persoually, or any other good history of' the variöus wars between those two powers, will see that an advance from the Danube to Adnanople by the Muscovites is likely to be anything but au easy task. The physical peculiarities of tho Dauube are all in favor of the Turks. The high banks are on the Turkish side, while suc islands as might form good supports for bridgcs are near the other bank, leavin; the broad and difflcult stream between. The left shores are low, wet anc marshy, the roads upon them often ; quagmires, aiid tlie whole country so ! tualarious that the Russians haVe usually lost more in foriner campaigns irom j eaae than in Dattle. The river can be , crossed on the ice, or at least partly so, ; during such a winter as this ; but the ' Russians ovidently have no liking for a winter campaign in suoh a difficult country, and in a month from now the ice will begin to break up and the roads to be iinpassable. At every suitable crossing the Turks have heavy works, besides -several 3trongly fortifled places. In former years the Russians have orossed on the many narrow channels near the raouth 3Í the Danube, but now the Turks command the Black sea, and their guuboats sught to control all the lower strearo. Iho Russians, if they succeed in crossing, must do it quite far up, by marching through Servia. By this advance they might, to a cjrtain degree, turn the posts on the Danube and some in the Balkans. But the danger would be that they would leave the Austrian corps of Dbservation directly in their rear in the Oarpathians. Provided a full understundiug were had with Austria, there would be no danger in this. Otherwise, it would bo fatal to such an approach to Cotstantinople. It is doubtful if any Ruseian army would venture a march on Adrianople with Shumla unmasked. This place is a sort of fortifled post at the foot of the Balkans, toward the river, oapable of holding 150,000 men. lts siege and capture would be a very difflcult matter. Varna, whioh lies uear the sea, would be irupregnable with the superiority of ihe Turkish fleet. And, indeed, this fact alone would compel the advanco of the Russians to be by interior lines to Adrianople. When it is remembered how tenaciously the Turks def end fortifled places, how much better equipped they are than was the case in 1828-9, and even in aome reppects better provided than in the Orimean war, it will be seen what a tesk the Russians have taken on themselvos in "drivingthe Turk from Europe." In former campaignfi, diseaso and sanitary neglect havo terribly thinned the Russian ranks, while the blunders of their commanders havo cpst them many defeats. In the last war the Turks, under Critish ofncers, were ao obstinate in defense that the forcea of the Czar scarcely crossed the river. In that, as in tbis, the Ottomans controlled the sea. Eveiything points to the march to Constantinople being, far írom a ' ' promenade," in fact, a long and bloody gle. The Turk has connted on thia in his obstinacy at the conference. He oould not lose more than he might by ft campaign - the chancea of war offer rnany escapes aud opportiinities. It is natural, too, that Itussia desires all tho time possible for such a sovere contest.