Stonewall's Boldest Coup

Stonewall's Boldest Coup

A FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY WAR STORY

May 23. 1862

SUCCESS in the combined attack on Richmond seemed sure the last week in May, 1862. The Merrimac had been destroyed, the James river was open to the Federal warships and transports to within seven miles of the goal, and McClellan's advance was rapidly closing in upon the outer defenses of the Confederate capital.

At Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock river, General McDowell's command, 40,000 strong, was under orders to march forward and unite with McClellan on the north of Richmond. In the Shenandoah valley, west of the Blue Ridge, the armies of Banks and Fremont lay convenient to railways communicating with Washington and Fredericksburg. In an emergency the troops in the valley could be thrown in front of Washington at any point to defend it from front attack or even rushed to the banks of the James.

The only foe nearer to Washington than that marshaled for the defense of Richmond was the command of Stonewall Jackson, last heard of by the Federals in the vicinity of Staunton, at the head of the Shenandoah valley, on the 8th of May. Some of the military chiefs of the north hoped that Stonewall might be sent to help defend Richmond at the very gates. It would be easier to locate him there and at least one threatening danger to the peace of Washington happily disposed of by his remoteness from the Potomac.

Stonewall's ideas of the things he ought to do for his flag were not In harmony with those of his enemies. News traveled swiftly within the Southern army lines, and Jackson knew that either the whole or part of McDowell's troops and portions of those of Fremont and Banks would be sent to swell the besieging lines in front of Richmond unless he furnished excitement for them on the slopes of the Blue Ridge. He had already proved this by attacking Banks' line after it had been stripped of soldiers to send eastward. The troops speedily came back and more with them and, in order to be ready for a second attempt at the same clever trick, settled down behind fortifications at Strasburg, about the center, lengthwise, of the valley. From Strasburg a good pike led back to the Baltimore and Ohio railway and the Potomac river, and a railroad running through a gap in the Blue Ridge placed Strasburg within a few hours of Washington and Fredericksburg.

Fremont's army lay within easy marches of Banks' post, and he held his troops ready to support Banks by falling upon Jackson should he march direct from Staunton to give Banks battle on his fortified front. Needless to say that credulous people believed that Jackson was securely "bagged," a favorite expression in certain circles at that time. The old fogy generals of Europe declared that Napoleon violated every principle of the art of war every time he moved an army. Jackson, with Banks in front of him, Fremont to the left of him and McDowell on the right rear of him, had but one move left according to the art of war. He must sneak away between the lines of Fremont and McDowell to the southwest by way of Lynchburg. He was looked to to do this or to turn up anywhere except where he actually landed the morning of the 23d of May.

Stonewall was too much of a soldier to see glory in the mere dodging of a trap set to catch him. He proceeded to smash the trap. After he had turned back Fremont's advance from its march upon his base at Staunton by a sudden stroke at the village of McDowell the 8th of May he sent his few companies of cavalry to press Fremont's outposts and also to keep up the scare In the center of the valley in front of Banks at Strasburg. All his enemies were by this time deeply mystified as to Jackson's way of doing things. They couldn't fathom his plans, and without risking even a skirmish he kept three armies on the alert for his sudden appearance. The opposing generals assumed that where Jackson's cavalry was there Jackson's infantry would be sooner or later; so they waited in their tracks for the infantry. But Jackson's cavalry was ubiquitous, and his infantry had already won the nickname of "Jackson's foot cavalry" by their rapidity in turning up where the enemy least expected them. The chief of Stonewall's mounted men was worthy of his master. Long before the war Turner Ashby was in training for the kind of outpost work Jackson needed in the valley campaign of 1862. Born and reared on the slopes of the Blue Ridge, he knew every footpath and hunter's trail between the Potomac and the headwaters of the Shenandoah. He was a social hero, a crack hunter and an all round saddle sportsman of the hills. Besides, he had soldier blood in his veins, tested in all the wars back to Braddock's Field. With his mounted militia Asnby had patrolled the Potomac during the John Brown trouble of 1859 and there made the acquaintance of the serious military professor.

Jackson had been through West Point and had also seen service in Mexico, and Ashby had the good sense to yield the palm of leadership to him. They became friends, and when the war broke out in 1861 Ashby followed Jackson to the field. As soon as Stonewall became an independent commander he chose Ashby for his chief of cavalry. For the purpose of mystifying the enemy Jackson, with Ashby on the warpath, was multiplied by two. Ashby let it be known that Jackson was going to attack Banks, and as his troopers were riding down the valley pike toward Banks' front at Strasburg the good people of the region supposed that Jackson was going down the valley too. What the people knew the enemy was quickly in possession of through the medium of scouts, and, according to data inside the Federal lines, Jackson was due at Strasburg about May 22. He did not come. But trifles delay an army; perhaps he would be along next day.

After paying his respects to Banks' pickets and giving the impression that Jackson would soon rush headlong down against those impregnable barrcades at Strasburg, Ashby vanished from the valley. He led his troopers eastward through the Blue Ridge and the morning of the 23d of May marched around Banks' flank guard at Front Royal, the pass of the railroad from Strasburg to Manassas plains. This pass Banks had left under guard of Colonel Kenly's Maryland volunteers with detachments of artillery end cavalry. Kenly had no warning from Strasburg that the enemy was moving his way. His pickets were surprised and captured or brushed aside, but he rallied the reserves and made a desperate fight at the bridge and along the railway track and wagon road back toward the Shenandoah pike in the rear of Banks.

Colonel Ashby had but few troopers tn his fighting ranks. Some whole companies and large detachments of others had been left to guard the crossroads on the way and to buffet and mystify the enemy. His task was to cut the telegraph and destroy the tracks so that Banks could not get word of his plight east of the Blue Ridge and call up help. But Kenly's men were good fighters. They turned every building into a blockhouse and used the railway embankment for a breastwork. At Buckton Station they gave Ashby his little Waterloo.

Failing to dislodge Kenly's men from their citadel at the station by feints farther down the line, Ashby gathered a handful and called upon them to follow. Speeding like hunters after game, they flew over the intervening fence and ditch, up the steep bank and with pistols and sabers rushed on the bayonets of the Marylanders. From the unequal fight the troopers fell back, but Ashby rallied them a second and a third time. Two captains were shot down by his side, and at the third failure he rode away, leaving the road for Jackson's infantry to clear.

Jackson's infantry had traveled farther than Ashby 's troopers in their flank march against Banks, but they had started earlier. Crossing the Blue Ridge through several passes, they reached Front Royal the afternoon of the 23d and swept up all that Ashby had left of Kenly's guard. The alarm of what Jackson was doing at Front Royal spread to Banks in time to save his army, but not to save Strasburg. Stonewall attacked his retreating column at Newtown, Middletown and Winchester on the 24th and 25th, capturing guns and wagon trains and cutting off detachments of troops all the way to the Potomac. The Banks end of the trap to catch Jackson was smashed.

For two days Washington was in terror. It was not known where Jackson would stop or whether he would stop at anythlng until he raided the northern capital. When Banks sent word that his army was safe on the Maryland shore, the military authorities took breath and ordered Fremont to close in upon Jackson's pathway in the valley and also that Shields' division east of the Blue Ridge should return to the valley at once and help Fremont "bag Jackson."

George L. Kilmer.

[image caption: Ashby's charge on the railroad guard.]