Popular Election Of Senators

According to tne arrangement of the democratie congressional caucus, we are to hear a discussion in the halls of congress on thO question of the popular electiom oí United States senators. That is all well and good ; thei-e is some d'ssatisfaction in the public m:Tid with our upper house of congress, and an aiiring of the sabject of its eleetton will do no hann, white on the other hand it may do eome good iin letting the eo-called irrespons.ble senators know that the people is watchüng them ■with a jealous eye. But it is quite another thing whether the elect;on of senators by a popular vote would be a wise thing. There is more than one side to thee question, and thie more study put upon it will convince tlie thinking citlzen that no ehange fro-m the piresent method would result in aaiy permanent adnantage, or even. in any temporary adviasntage to the country. The people are too hasty, as a usual thimg, to grasp at proposed changes in governmental aífalrs as a means of eraancipation from existing evïls, real or imagLnary. Change often brings rniore and greater evils than already exist ; aaid it is mot altogether unlikely that the pt-oposed chamge ïn the election oí our senators would bring on greater deadvantages than already prevail. At least there ie room for considera ble dscussion on negati"e s'de oí the questiom. Tlie question demands au exaniination into the euds tliat the present oa-gaaiization of t.he upper branch was designed to subserve. These ands were briefly as follows : 1. To preserve the equality of the several etates, as demanded by the smaller 6tates at the time oí the formatio-n of the piresent constltution in 1787-0. 2. To créate a council qualified to serve as a check on the president in tlie matter oi mak'ng appointments and in makiig treaties. 3. To Sict as ia check on the popular house -vhea suddem guste of popular opiiion miglit eausi' hasty legislation that avouUI eventually result in detriment to the country. í. To provide a leg'slative body iiose greater experience, longer term of menibership and "comparaf.ve indep:iidenceof popular elsct'tm'' woull aaake them an element of strength and stabil ty in the govemment. Tliese were, in brief, tlie aims of Pouniere o[ tlie constitution In establishi'ng the senate on the basis on whieh it is now, and has been for ome hi'.iidred years, exercis'ng Ita leg-; itlTe (umetioma. At least these were the uitvis oí tlie senate in the mind of the greatest of Feder.il sts, A li' va uil er Ilamilton. It muet 1k admitted that no new itinctioiis ot tlie senate have been developiMl in its ct'ïitury oí existenee ; at least none that are esenlially new am that n thcmselvcs would deniand any fundamental change in the manBer "f tte ïurnintOn. Tlie iirst two of these ends the popntar ■electiom of the senate could nol directly affect, niasmucli as they are dependent almö.st entirely on the fact of equal repceeentation, which would in aio wise be affected. It is not o dOTibtiul that the third item of the ron.stitution-makers would not be affected. It is, wlthin the range of possiblity that the character of the semate might be eo changed that this oVject of the present constitution of tin. senate would be defeated ; for popular election m;iiht a.nd pirobably wonald materially lor t lie quality and nbllity of the upper house. Tliat "compfuratiTe independence of popular electioin," wli'ch Alexander Ham il ton counted on as "an element oí stabil:ty in the go vemimcnt of the ii.-n ion. enabling it to maintain its character in tho eyes of t'oreign states and to preserve a comthmity of policy at home and abroad" would, however, be lost. And, M Mr. Hamilton knew what he was talktng about, the fifth end of the seoiate would be destroyed. The question rema'ns, was the opinión of thiis graat 6tatesmaai, who it muBt bi adiuiitted, was inordinately fond of a etrong ceiitralized governraent, coiTect ? "Would popular elecliou take away thO d'gnity oi the iba and dcstroy its power as a bemeftoemt check on the fickleness of the house o{ representatives ? If th's effeci can le ]roved tüieai it would be better to leae th-e senate as it is. It wo n ld. in the first place, change the cliaracter of the senator, niaking Min íi d'.rect representa tive of the 1im])1i and not of the state, as lie is at present. Electícm by the people lavolves direct responsibiUty to them, while at present the senator stamde on the broad ground of representative of the state. Popular electiom Involves obediejiee to faction amd to eection, accord'ng to the el ■■ mente comcerned in fc's election. Tiie rharacter of tho Betaate as the representatiie of the States would be destroyed amd tliat body would descend lch in dgnitj' and in the cons'ideration of tlie natjons of the world. TJiis may seem l;ke a fanciful objection, but it was a strorag oaie in the mind of so trood a stateeman as Mr. Hamilton. Tli!s change might produce a shuultaaieous alteraron in the character oí our senators. Tliey would siink to tlie level of the present popular representative, whose availabil ty would be his chief qualit'ication for the office, and not as at present bis ability, hls position, and perhaps hicidentally his wealth. The former qualif catiom may be the end whieh the present demand is anxíous to attaAn, for the stock argument in favxr oi tlne popular vote, is tliat the seinate is at present too íar away from the people, and iB too much influenced by considerations that are not in its intei'est. It may be that the eenate has recently exercised its fuinction as a, check on the lower house iin too great, and ierliaps in some cases, ón an unwarranted degree. It fe not, however, to be supposed tliat tliie tempora.ry estrangement will, of necess'ty, be permanent. On tlie ■oiitrary. it :s very natural to piresume that the ill will ol the people, as at present being niiiiiiíested, will briiiff tlie erring senators back into the straTght and narrow jiaHi. Tlie emtiu'e incompetency of the senate must be pro ved bef ore such a íundameintal ciiange in the const tution i.s warranted, as is proposed for a remedy. Popular electiom may be correct when applied as a principie of pure demociracy, but with our pres: ent political constitution it would scarcely seem wise to make a change. Tlie American senate has always stood too h%h in the estimation, not only ot the American people, but in tlie estimation of the whole thinking world, to tñimk of destroying its dignity and efficiency because of a teanporarjr bit of careleseness that the crit!cism of an omnipotent people wi!l be eufficiemt to coiirect.