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The Supreme Court Decides That Mrs. Fillmore Cannot Collect Her Claim This Way

The Supreme Court Decides That Mrs. Fillmore Cannot Collect Her Claim This Way image
Parent Issue
Day
16
Month
January
Year
1895
Copyright
Public Domain
OCR Text

On Wednesday last the Supreme Court handed down a decisión that will be of great interest to the local tent of Maccabees, and probably be the meara of saying the great camp a considerable expenditure of money. About two years ago Catherine M. Fillmore, of this city, widow of the late Aid. Fillmore, of the Third ward, brought action against the local camp to recover on a policy held by her late husband. She asked the court to set aside the order made just previous to his death expelling him. Mr. Fillmore joined the order in 1885, and at that time one of the by-laws provided that no inember should be connected in any way with the sale or manufacture of spirituous liquors. A later rule was passed which stated that a inember who violated this rule should forfeit his membership and all benefits accruing thereto, and that no officer of any tent should accept dues and assessments from him. PÜRCHASED BREWERY STOCK. Afterward Fillmore became theowner of $5,000 worth of stock in a brewery. Action was taken to expel him, but he subsequently paid one assessment, but was notified that it could not be treated as such and would be paid back on demand. It was nót forwarded to the great camp. Fillmore soon died and the widow was informed that her claim was worthless on account of the above rules. She sued for the amount of the policy. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint and reversed the decree of the Circuit Court, allowing the claim. The Supreme Court says that the basis of the widow's claim is the endowment certifícate, which provides for the payment of $2,000 to her, provided the assured shall in every particular comply with the rules and regulations of the order. The conditions were : Satisfactory proof of the death of her husband ; surrender of the certifícate ; that he had in every particular complied with the rules and regulations of the order. Among the first allegations of Mrs. Filluiore's bill is that of compliance by her husband of all the rules and regulations. The denial of this raised the question of fact upon which her right to the fund depends, and this question the association claimed could not be tried by the tribunals of the order, and that the decisión of the latter is final. Section 83 of the rules and regulations of the order is cited as sustaining this contention. It is as follows : "The executive committee shall have power to pass upon all death claims, and if in their judgment any such claim is not valid on its face they shall notify the beneficiary or beneficiarles of the deceased member thereof, and give them or their attorneys an ópportunity to appear before such committee withm ninety days thereafter and present such evidence as they may have to establish the justness of the said claim, and such decisión will be binding on such claimant unless an appeal he taken to the great camp. The notice of the appeal from the decisión oí the committee must be filed with the great record keeper within sixty days thereafter. The decisión of the great camp in all such cases shall be final and no suit in law or equity shall be commenced or maintained by any member or beneficiary against the great camp." PROVISIONS ARE BROAD. The court says that the provisions of this section are broad. If the language means anything it is that all who have death claims must subrnit them to the executive committee, and that its decisión, or that of the great camp, if an appeal be taken, shall be final. The contention of Mrs. Fillmore's council that this section means that if the beneficiary sees fit to submit a claim to the tribuuals of the order the decisión is final, but if she does not choose to do so the courts have jurisdiction, which is equivalent to saying that a beneficiary may appeal to either at her option, the court says, does violenceto the language. The section gives power tothe executive committee upon all death claims, in express language. If they question the validity thereof, they shall notify the beneficiary, and give an ópportunity to be heard. This was done in this case, or if it be contended that it was not regularly done the right of a hearing remains under this section. It was claimed, however, that this section cannot be literally construed because it is opposed to public policy that a citizou should be denied the privileges of the courts, and the case appears to have turned upon this point in the circuit court. This question the court says, as upplied to mutual benefit associations is not a new one in this state. It was passed upon in the recent case of Hemberu versus the Great Camp, and was elaborately discussed by Justice Montgomery, and authorities cited. The opinión says, therefore, that it must be considered settled that the section referred to is valid and does not so far contravene public policy as to permit parties who contract with reference to it, or their privies, to seek relief in the state courts, rather than in those of the order. ALLEGED PKAÜD. The bill of complaint also alleged fraud on the part of the order, and it was further contended that Mrs. Fillmore's case had been prejudged, and that there were sufficient reasons to entitle her to relief in equity. As to the question of fraud, the court says it may be passed with the remark that the evidence shows no bad faith on the part of the order or committee. If not satisfied with the decisión of the committee, the case may go before the order itself, the great camp, which presumably, at least, will be disposed to do justice. The great camp had taken no action in this matter. The most that canbe said is that the great commander, upon request of Fillmore's local tent undertook to expel Fillmore, and later the executive committee notifled the widow that, in their judgment the claim was invalid. The court says that in this there was nothing to disqualify the great camp, and that the widow should have prosecuted her claim before the tribunals of the order in accordance witli the contract made by her husband when he became a member. The decree of the circuit court was, therefore, reversed and the bill of coraplaint dismissed.

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Subjects
Old News
Ann Arbor Courier